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Abstract 
 
 
 Immigration in the European Union is an issue increasingly discussed by EU member 
states and researcher across the world.  Although immigrants come to Europe from many 
countries across the world, flows from North Africa constitute a substantial percentage of total 
immigration, in particular to France and Spain.  While many studies focus on the impact of this 
immigration on EU member states, this paper discusses the issues faced by immigrants and how 
they are impacted by host state policymaking.  Drawing from case studies on France and Spain, 
the paper provides an assessment of how human security and immigration are interrelated.  It 
then analyzes immigration policies in France and Spain, laying the groundwork for an overview 
of the situation in Europe.   
Policies in both France and Spain have an impact on human security of immigrants, 
especially those related to immigration control and integration.  At the EU level, limited 
integration on immigration policies has limited the ability of the organization to do more than 
suggest that member states coordinate their efforts.  EU policies have also not had much effect 
on human security of immigrants until recently.  Changes following the 2008-2009 economic 
crisis have the potential to pave the way for increased integration, though the future of a human 
security doctrine in the EU remains uncertain.    
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Background 
 
Migration has been a frequently occurring phenomenon in European history.  From 
wandering Roma to asylum-seekers fleeing war-torn countries across the globe, many 
populations are on the move.  Although public opinion
1
 tends to be negative toward immigrants, 
there is a clear demand for foreign, and especially unskilled, labor.  Low birth rates combined 
with aging populations leave gaps in the European labor market, which must be filled to keep up 
economic growth.  Simultaneously, immigrants are attracted to these European jobs and come to 
earn higher wages to better support themselves and their families.  Although the expansion of the 
European Union has led to cross-continental flows of people who compete with immigrants for 
employment, as newer member states catch up with the veterans, it is likely that they too will 
need outside sources of labor.        
One of the most contentious immigration issues in Europe today is the influx of Muslim 
immigrants, the majority of them from North African countries.  Immigration from the Maghreb 
to the EU has been principally concentrated in France and Spain.  This group has struggled with 
assimilation into European societies and is subject to significant discrimination and social 
stigma, or more broadly, threats
2
 to human security (Janoski, Alford, Hicks, & Schwartz, 2005, 
p. 640).  Both France and Spain have had different historical experiences with immigration, and 
hence they serve as useful comparative case studies of how Muslim immigration is impacting 
Europe, highlighting the human security risks faced by immigrants, and relative policy 
implications.  As the EU has been considering implementing a human security paradigm at the 
regional level, it is worth investigating whether coordination of immigration policies would be 
                                                          
1
 Recessions or depressions worsen public opinion because of increased unemployment rates (Janoski, et. al.,  2005, 
p. 632). 
2
 Generally, human security risks or threats refer to negative effects on the human security of immigrants.  
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compatible with such an approach.  Both France and Spain have struggled to cope with human 
security aspects of immigration, but there seems to be potential for increased cooperation 
through the EU.   
Definition of the problem 
 
 Within the EU, several member states are struggling to develop immigration policies that 
both allow them to fulfill the needs of their labor markets and also avoid offending the general 
population.  It is a difficult balance and some states have been more successful than others.  
Immigration also brings up human security concerns; immigrant groups tend to be susceptible to 
various risks such as discrimination (which may result in violence), lack of education, inadequate 
housing, and poverty.  European states and the EU as a whole have a vested interest in ensuring 
the security of all people living in Europe.  If the immigrant laborers fear for their physical safety 
or are living in urban slums then they are less likely to be efficient at work.  The vulnerability of 
immigrants may also depend on the region they are immigrating from.  A Sub-Saharan African, 
for example, who just barely survived the crossing to Spain by boat, is likely to be worse off than 
a Turk who studies in Europe and becomes an immigrant by overstaying his or her visa.      
 The focus of this paper is to examine the relationship between immigration and human 
security.  The European Union was chosen as a microcosm for the situation worldwide because it 
simultaneously shows interest in human security as a concept and has many countries with self-
identified immigration issues.  Although immigration policies can be coordinated at the EU 
level
3
, member states still maintain the authority to formulate them.  For this reason, two case 
studies (France and Spain) were chosen from within the EU to allow for comparison and in-
                                                          
3
 The EU has more influence over asylum and refugee issues than immigration (European Union Policy towards a 
Common European Asylum System).  Coordination is the stated goal at the EU level, though this seems to occur 
only on a limited basis.   
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depth analysis of how immigration and human security are interrelated.  To facilitate 
comparison, a specific immigrant population was also selected (North Africans
4
, who emigrate in 
large numbers to both France and Spain).   This thesis will, therefore, attempt to answer the 
following questions: 
1) What do the cases of North African immigration to France and Spain reveal about 
human security concerns in the EU and what implications does this have for 
policymaking? 
2) Could French and Spanish immigration policies be better coordinated through the 
European Union in order to address these threats to the human security of 
immigrants? 
Definition of concepts: review of the literature 
 
There are several concepts that need to be defined, drawing from immigration literature, 
to maintain consistency throughout this paper.  To begin, the UN defines immigrants as “persons 
outside of their country of birth or citizenship for at least 12 months, for any reason and in any 
legal status” (Martin, Martin, & Weil, 2006).  For the purposes of this paper, an individual will 
be considered an immigrant from the time they leave their country of origin if they intend to stay 
in Europe for a prolonged period of time.  The purpose of this is to include human security risks 
faced by some immigrants on the trip to the European continent.  For the case of Spain this 
distinction is particularly important because of the dangerous means by which entry is obtained.  
All references to immigrants in this paper refer specifically to North African immigrants unless 
otherwise noted.     
                                                          
4
 Based on HDI indicators, North Africans represent fairly “average” immigrants; as World Bank development 
statistics indicate, the situation they faced in their own countries was not as bad as in Sub-Saharan Africa, but more 
challenging than in East Asian or other Middle Eastern states like Turkey (World Bank, 2009). 
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As explained in the 2005 Human Security Report, a study put forth by the Human 
Security Centre, Liu Institute for Global Issues at the University of British Columbia, “human 
security is a relatively new concept, now widely used to describe the complex of interrelated 
threats associated with civil war, genocide and the displacement of populations” (p. viii). Use of 
the concept shifts traditional conceptions of security from the nation state to the individual.  
Human security has generally been defined in two ways.  The narrow definition, freedom from 
fear, was promoted by the Japanese government and is most often cited to protect individuals 
from violent conflict, in particular from violence that comes from within their own state 
(Remacle, 2008).  In this regard, genocide, civil war, discrimination and segregation (the extreme 
example being apartheid in South Africa) are human security risks.  The broad definition of 
human security is far more inclusive and combines freedom from fear and freedom from want.  
This definition has been utilized by the Canadian government and many scholars to add 
development concerns to the list of human security risks, such as poverty, environmental 
degradation, hunger, and disease (Ibid.). 
 In this paper, the broad definition of human security will be employed to capture all 
aspects of insecurity faced by immigrants.  The specific human security risks expected to be 
found in France and Spain includes the following: discrimination, xenophobia, possible violence 
toward immigrants, unemployment, and low quality of housing.  Immigrants facing a 
combination of these risks will be less secure than groups that are free from these problems, 
specifically the citizens of the host state.  It should be noted that for some immigrants, life in 
Europe is substantially more secure than in their countries of origin.  For migrants moving from 
one EU member state to another, the difference is less drastic.  Nonetheless, using a human 
security lens to address immigration in the EU turns the attention from how states are affected to 
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the day to day struggles of immigrants.  This perspective is rarely addressed in human security or 
immigration literature.  From research, it seems that three books
5
 have been published in recent 
years that link human security and immigration, which is vastly less than the wealth of literature 
discussing immigration from a national security perspective.     
 Also essential to this project is an understanding of the terms „policy‟, „policymaking‟, 
and „policy analysis‟.  In this paper, the definition of „policy‟ will be a government plan to 
address one or more immigration-related issues.  By leaving the definition fairly broad, policies 
that affect immigrants, even if they are not being singled out, can be included.  Examples of 
immigration-related issues include: terms of legal entry, integration
6
 and assimilation, access to 
public services, protection from discrimination, reuniting of families, and extradition.  Logically, 
policymaking is the process by which the government (or EU institutions) creates policies.  
Because policymaking can vary according to government structure and is affected by variables 
like public opinion, there will be discussion of this process in the case studies.  The paper will 
also treat bilateral agreements with immigrant-sending states and the creation of organizations or 
government bodies as part of the policymaking process because they these actions also intend to 
achieve some political agenda.  Dunn (2008) defines policy analysis as a “process of 
multidisciplinary inquiry designed to create, critically assess, and communicate information that 
is useful in understanding and improving policies” (p. 1).    In order to understand immigration 
policy and to make recommendations about where it is best addressed, it is important to look at 
what types of polices are being enacted in member states (drawing from the French and Spanish 
                                                          
5
 These works are “Migration, regional integration, and human security,” edited by Kleinschmidt, “Migration, 
globalization, and human security,” edited by Graham and Poku, and “Human trafficking, human security, and the 
Balkans,” edited by Friman and Reich.    
6
 Social integration policies are those that lead to improvements in human security of immigrants, though it is 
important to also consider other policies that could make immigrants less secure, such as issuing works permits that 
will force immigrants to seek employment through illicit channels.   
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cases) as well as at the EU level.  From there, it must be determined how effective these policies 
are in achieving their desired outcome.  Particular attention will be paid to those that address 
human security of immigrants
7
.  As a result of analyzing immigration policies in the EU, Spain, 
and France, it should be possible to draw conclusions about where to best address human 
security concerns of immigrants.   
 Finally, there is some relevant theory that should be addressed as a foundation for the 
case studies.  Theory-building to explain the political effects of immigration has been limited 
until recently.  According to Janoski, Alford, Hicks, et. al. (2005), there are four types of theory 
that can be used to describe immigration in host states: “(1) power resources or power 
constellation theories, (2) state-centric and institutional theories, (3) cost-benefit or economic 
theories, and (4) cultural and racial/racialization theories” (p. 631).  Of these, the most powerful 
and relevant for consideration as we move into a discussion of France and Spain are the theories 
of power resources, cost-benefit theories, and cultural/racial theories.  Power resources theory 
explains that politics reacts to immigration by balancing “political party power, ethnic 
organization, and…business and trade union power” (Ibid., p, 631).  This is clearly the case in 
most European states where the interests of various actors and the cleavages created by 
immigration must be juggled.  Cost-benefit theories are also relevant because the Spanish 
economy in particular relies on foreign labor to maintain its agricultural sector.  Therefore, 
actions to restrict immigration must involve balancing the need for labor.  Because Europe is 
predominantly composed of a single ethnic group, racial theories may explain some of the 
reaction of the public against immigrants of another racial group.  Cultural theories explain why 
European citizens and immigrants have a hard time associating within a single society.  Janoski, 
                                                          
7
 The effectiveness of all major policies enacted by the French and Spanish governments will be considered because 
many of them may have direct or indirect implications for the human security of immigrants.  It will be noted which 
do in the chart included in Appendix B.  
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et. al. discuss the role of negative public opinion through the “Freeman and Money‟ Theory of 
nonsalience and interest-group domination of immigration policies” (2002, p. 639).   
Case studies 
France 
Immigration Profile 
 
France is the oldest and second largest
8
 immigrant recipient country in Europe, as it 
began inviting foreigners in during the 1800s (Cole, Le Gales, & Levy, 2005, p. 154; Oommen, 
2002, p. 87).  Since the end of its colonial period, marked by the conclusion of the Algerian War 
of Independence in 1962, it has received significant numbers of immigrant from North Africa 
and West Africa.  Almost immediately, French society began to see the effects of this 
immigration.  In 1974, rent strikes were held by a group of immigrants against SONACOTRA
9
 
as they were frustrated by French policies established to deal with them and, in particular, with 
their living conditions (Ireland, 1994, p. 55).  The use of strikes would continue to be a popular 
way for immigrants to voice their frustrations, although they tend to be problematic for France‟s 
economy.  During the “hot summer” of 1981 in Lyons, North African immigrants looted, stole 
cars, and carried out other stunts to scare the public and otherwise disturb the peace (Ibid., p. 78).  
In 1989, three Muslim girls were forbidden to attend school because they insisted on wearing the 
Islamic headscarf, or hijab.  This ordeal became the first in a series of incidents called the affaire 
du foulard in French (Ibid., p. 90).  Widespread urban riots broke out in March 2005 on the 
outskirts of most major cities across France, which represented a “major upheaval for French 
society” (Laurence & Vaisse, 2006, p. 2).  These immigrants took to the streets and burned cars 
                                                          
8
 Basic demographic data about France is available in Appendix 1. 
9
 SONACONTRA is an agency that builds and manages public housing for immigrants. 
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among other things in protest of housing situations in the banlieues.  In the 1980s the groups 
SOS Racisme and France Plus participated in the Marche pour l-Egalité et contre le Racisme, the 
March for Equality and against Racism (Laurence & Vaisse, 2006, p. 89).  Throughout this 
whole historical period, the various associations created by immigrants from the Maghreb have 
contributed to cases that have disrupted French society. 
Today, France has a significant Muslim minority population with many immigrants from 
former French colonies in North Africa.  The BBC estimated that in 2004 there were between 
five and six million Muslims living in France, which comprised approximately 8% of the total 
population (Muslims in Europe, 2005).  France currently has the largest Muslim minority in 
Europe in terms of percentage of total population (Ibid.). In 2006, Laurence & Vaisse estimated 
that France had five million persons of Muslim origin, out of a total of 61 million people living 
there (p. 1).  Over time, the number of immigrants from North Africa has consistently grown, as 
has the percentage of immigrants making up the total population of France.  While the numbers 
vary greatly depending on the definitions of terms such as “immigrant” and whether or not 
estimates of illegal immigrants are included, the consensus seems to be that the rapid growth of 
the 70s and 80s has slowed some.  While the persistent influx of North African immigrants may 
be viewed as purely negative in nature, the reality is that immigration does play an important 
demographic role in France as in several other European states like the UK and Germany.  In the 
years to come, low birth rates amongst those of European descent will cause population growth 
to stagnate or become negative.  France will continue to require some immigration for its 
economy, but to a lesser extent than other European states because of its comparatively higher 
birth rate (Laurence & Vaisse, 2006 p. 26).  Because immigrants tend to have higher birth rates, 
they help the population of Europe grow, thereby facilitating economic growth as well. 
13 
 
Along with immigrants from North Africa, France also hosts Sub-Saharan Africans, 
Turks, and Eastern Europeans.  According to the Institut national d‟études démographiques, in 
2007 there were 7,877 new immigrants from Eastern Europe compared to 83,606 from Africa 
(By year, nationality, and continent, 2009). The Institut national de la statistique et des études 
économiques gives more specific data by country.  In 2003, there were 28,554 new immigrants 
from Algeria, 22,339 from Morocco, and 9,425 from Tunisia, bringing the North African total to 
60,318 (Flux d'immigration permanente par motif).  There were also 8,613 entrants from Turkey 
and 26,923 immigrants from non-Maghrebi Africa (Ibid.).  While North Africans remain the 
most substantial immigrant group in France, the numbers from other regions are noteworthy.   
There are some additional social effects of North African immigration that deserve 
additional attention as they contribute to not only the human security of immigrant but also the 
way in which French society functions.  The influx of North Africans has diversified the French 
population, which is something the French are not necessarily in favor of.  As suggested by 
Messina & Lahav (2006), the French have a very specific and well-defined concept of what their 
own nationality is as a result of “their monarchical gestation, Revolutionary birth, and 
Republican apotheosis” (p. 413).  The French seem to believe, as indicated by public opinion and 
protests, that their very identity is being threatened by immigration.  The fact that so many 
immigrants are Muslim has been one of the most difficult issues, as it tends to contradict the 
French notion of secularism, or laïcité
10
.  Due to the fundamental differences in religion, culture, 
and other characteristics, migrants from the Maghreb have more difficulty assimilating
11
 into 
French society than other immigrant groups, such as Eastern Europeans.  As a result of 
                                                          
10
 Benhabib (2004) has defined laïcité as “neutrality of the state toward all kinds of religious practices, 
institutionalized through a vigilant removal of sectarian religious symbols, signs, icons, and items of clothing from 
official public spheres” (p. 186). 
11
 Assimilation is defined as the “process by which a social or ethnic minority adopts the dominant values and the 
traditional behavior of the society into which it is inserted” (Stovall & Van Den Abbeele, 2003, p. 220).  
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immigration, Islam has now become the second most prominent religion in France, which means 
it will only continue to be a factor in the future (Stovall & Van Den Abbeele, 2003, p. 13).  The 
conflict between Islam and the secular French state has fueled two conflicts that are fundamental 
to a discussion of immigration in France: the problems of the banlieues and l’affaire du foulard.  
In France the principle of equity is fundamental and citizenship is interpreted in a strict 
and universal manner.  This explains why it is so important to the French to have immigrants 
integrated into their society, as difficult as it may be (Oomen, 2002, p. 4).  At the same time, 
France expects immigrants to take the initiative to assimilate and provides them with relatively 
little assistance (Ibid., p, 159).  It is assumed that they wish to become citizens and do to that 
they have to be able to prove that they have made the necessary effort to learn French and have 
become part of French society.  Upon arriving in France, many Muslim immigrants head straight 
to large cities like Paris or Marseille where they seek the familiar in banlieues such as Clichy-
sous-Bois (Ibid., p. 160).  Although this makes their transition easier at first, it impedes the 
assimilation
12
 process over the long-term, in effect reinforcing the negative perception of 
immigrants held by French citizens.  Though steps have been taken to make these neighborhoods 
less like ghettos (through urban renewal policies), that stigma remains.  The banlieues are often 
overcrowded and plagued by a “mix of everyday violence, gang-type social systems, an 
indigenous code of conduct and honor, the assertion of „masculine‟ identity, and an emphasis on 
territoriality” (Laurence & Vaisse, 2006, p. 36).   
In March 2005, widespread riots broke out in these neighborhoods across France. The 
violence was fueled by legitimate concerns over the ability of French citizens born to immigrant 
                                                          
12
 Stovall & Van Den Abbeele (2003) explain that assimilation or integration implies the intervention of public 
institutions in order to help make individuals part of the “imagined community” (p. 221). 
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parents to have access to the job market, government pressure placed on immigrants to integrate, 
and poor quality of housing available in the banlieues (Ibid., p. 2).  As evidenced by Money 
(1999), immigrant populations tend to have bigger families and more people live together in tight 
quarters, which often causes the condition of the buildings they live in to deteriorate more 
quickly (p. 123).  Public services, such as transportation, medical care, and the education system, 
are also affected by immigration.  If these services are not properly expanded to meet the 
increased needs of a population that is teeming with new crowds of immigrants, it logically 
follows that they would be overworked, overburdening, and overcrowded.  Of course, in urban 
areas such as the banlieues, these effects are even more apparent, especially since they are 
usually the most neglected by the government.  In an article in Le Figaro, Rioufol (2007) wrote 
that “immigration ceases to be an opportunity for France when it leads it to school dropouts, the 
exclusion of the poor, ethnic violence, Islamic communitarianism, and the fracture of French 
identity.
13” (p. 1).  The violence of 2005 has become the hallmark low-point in the French battle 
to “control” immigration.  
Related to the issue of the banlieues is the case of the affaire du foulard.  In response to 
perceived threats against the concept of laïcité in France the government banned religious 
symbols from being worn in public schools (law 2004-228 of 15 March 2004).  Although the ban 
stands for all religious symbols such as crosses or yarmulkes, the most divisive prohibited 
symbol is the hijab (foulard).  Not allowing Muslim women and girls to wear the hijab in 
schools runs contrary to their cultural and religious practices.  According to the BBC, the Quran 
does not require that Muslim women wear a veil (Religion and ethics, 2009).  Rather, it instructs 
them to dress modestly especially in the presence of strangers.  It was believed that efforts like 
                                                          
13
 Translation is the author‟s own work. 
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the ban on headscarves would reduce discrimination, but some Muslims perceive it as an attack 
on their faith.  Some Muslim women have resorted to wearing the veil as a political statement in 
response to the ban.  Recently, the French government also began working on a policy to prohibit 
wearing of the voile integrale, or the niqab
14
, from public places, such as in hospitals or on 
public transportation vehicles like buses (France moves toward partial burqa ban, 2010).  The 
ban affects fewer than two thousand young women in France today, but is yet another reminder 
of the struggle between Muslim immigrants and laïcité.  Many of those choosing full covering 
are second or third generation immigrants or new converts to Islam (War of French dressing).  
The rector of the Paris Mosque, Dalil Boubakeur, believes that the appearance of the niqab in 
France can be attributed to the influence of salafism, a radical branch of Islam (Ibid.). 
Immigration in France also has a fundamental economic component.  Immigration is 
often spurred on by the demand the economy has for labor, and when this demand cannot be 
fulfilled by native workers, the need for immigration increases significantly (Cornelius et al., 
1994).  Without enough people to fill the required jobs, the French economy would not be able to 
sustain steady growth.  This predicament is a common characteristic of many of the economies in 
Europe, which is a result of being highly developed and having a native population that is 
reluctant to perform certain jobs.  Immigrants are often more than willing to accept undesirable 
employment, as finding any job at all is highly beneficial for them.   
France‟s economy shows obvious signs of being affected by immigration in several 
facets.  Messina and Lahav (2006) claim that France has received sizeable economic gains from 
immigrant labor (p. 152).   First of all, the French economy has become dependent, to a certain 
                                                          
14
 Although the French refer to this garment as the burqa, the ban actually relates to the full covering worn in the 
Gulf region which has a slit for the eyes, called the niqab.  Burqas like those worn in Afghanistan are not worn by 
Muslim women in France (War of French dressing, 2010). 
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extent, on immigrant labor from the Maghreb.  From a human security point of view, workers do 
face risks when they immigrate to find employment.  The sectors of the economy that most 
immigrants work in are often temporary jobs, such as construction (Wrench et al., 1999, p. 76).  
These sectors are highly susceptible to any fluctuations in the economy, which can serve as a 
warning sign for a state when things begin to become uncontrollable.  Since these jobs are less 
secure, when a recession occurs immigrants are often among the many that lose their jobs, which 
we have seen with the recent economic crisis as in the past.  Between 1980 and 1982, the 
unemployment rate for foreigners rose substantially: from 9% to 19% for foreigners in general, 
with Moroccans, Algerians, and Tunisians having rates of 28%, 29%, and 34% respectively 
(Ibid.).  When immigrant groups go on strike in protest of living or working conditions, this can 
cause problems for the productivity of the industries that employ significant numbers of migrant 
workers.   In the past these strikes were frequent and sometimes long-lasting, which amplified 
the effects they had on France‟s economy.  Overall, France‟s economy has benefitted from the 
source of labor that immigrants provide, but there are some clear signs that immigration can be 
problematic at times, such as during strikes. 
Policymaking process variables: political structure, cleavages, and public opinion 
 
The policymaking process in France is as complicated as in most other states.  In order to 
understand how and why France has developed certain immigration policies, it is prudent to first 
analyze the variables that impact their formation.  By considering the political structure, internal 
political cleavages, and public opinion in France, the differences between France and Spain can 
also be accounted for as their policies are compared.    
Like most other European states, the long-established French political system, which in 
many aspects dates back to the French Revolution, has undergone relatively frequent changes in 
18 
 
existing political parties since the 1960s.  Nonetheless, French political parties can still be 
categorized into right, center, and left wings.  It is true that the lines between these divisions are 
somewhat blurrier than they have been historically (Franklin, Mackie, & Valen, 1992, p. 167).  
The three largest parties in France are the Socialist Party (PS), Union for the Republic (RPR), 
and Union for French Democracy (UDF).  All three of these parties have undergone name 
changes, the loss of splinter factions, and/or mergers with other similar parties (Baldersheim & 
Daloz, 2003, p. 70).  No single party has dominated the French political scene, but there have 
been periods when blocks of parties or coalitions have retained control for significant periods of 
time.   
The reason for the transformation of parties seems to lie at least partially in the social 
changes the country has experienced in recent decades.  The French party system underwent a 
series of splits as recently as the 1990s.  For example, the splinter party MDC (Mouvement des 
Citoyens) emerged from the umbrella of the PS (Cole, Le Gales, & Levy, 2005, p. 20).  Since the 
1960s, the French have become less religious and more highly educated.  Catholicism still keeps 
some voters on the „right‟ side of the fence simply on principle, but the strengthening of 
secularism, laïcité, appears to be affecting political ideologies and therefore affiliations (Ibid., p. 
171).  While religion and social class cleavages persist, Franklin, Mackie, & Valen have ruled 
out generation as an explanatory factor in the changes in vote choice (1992, p. 173).  Additional 
cleavages in France include: Eurosceptics versus Europeanists and self-employed versus 
employees (Cole, Le Gales, & Levy, 2005, p. 45).  Despite these cleavages, there is still some 
unexplained variability in political parties.   
Beyond the social changes that occurred in France beginning in the 1970s, there is still 
some party structure mutability left unexplained.  Why exactly did the stability of the French 
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system change in the 1960s?  Without doing delving too deeply into French history, it is likely 
that increased involvement in the European Union or reaching a certain level of economic 
development encouraged it.  It seems probable that French citizens are voting more on the basis 
of issues and that as issues evolve so do political parties.  In 2002, the centripetal French political 
system withstood a difficult shock.  In the presidential elections of that year there were 16 
candidates, the most ever, and voting patterns were particularly unpredictable.  Left wing parties 
failed to form a strong enough coalition and did not gather enough support to move beyond the 
first ballot.  In their place up against the right was none other than the right wing extremist party 
Front National, whose charismatic leader had charmed the disillusioned youth, the unemployed, 
blue collar workers, and corporate executives (Baldersheim & Daloz, 2003, p. 77).  Those who 
voted for Le Pen mostly did so out of protest because they felt that they couldn‟t identify with 
either the left or the right at the time.  Social cleavages, with a few exceptions mostly related to 
immigration and unemployment, played less of a role in that election. 
Overall, the French seem to identify mostly strongly with the French state rather than 
some other entity.  When asked, most people will say they are French, followed by European or a 
member of a department.  Interestingly, the fact that EU citizenship has because as or more 
important than local identities (and in some countries even national identities) is causing some to 
reconsider power politics.  The balance of power between the EU and its member states 
increasingly plays a role in discussions of issues formerly only addressed at the national level.  
Oomen (2002) states boldly that “Europe is both the cradle and the graveyard of the nation-
state”, suggesting that the EU may be altering traditional conceptions of power or identity (p. 
26).  These variables may explain some of the political changes in France.   
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The response to the perceived threats of immigration has come in the form of the 
development of the racist right wing party Front National in France.  There are some indications 
that immigration of particularly non-white Muslims is indeed causing social cleavages within 
Europe; the problem of the French banlieues is the most iconic example; non-white and 
predominantly Muslim “ghettos” on the outskirts of Paris have been the setting for violent 
protests on the part of immigrants against the French government and policies they believe to be 
discriminatory and repressive.  Immigration in Europe may be contributing to the formation of 
two new types of social cleavages.  First, there is sufficient evidence that there is a cleavage 
between immigrants and non-immigrants.  As will be examined below, this is very apparent 
when considered in the case of the affaire du foulard, or the headscarf affair, in France.  Lack of 
sufficient integration into society sets immigrants apart, regardless of their citizenship status.  
Second, there may also be a cleavage between immigration proponents and immigration 
opponents.  This cleavage is less clear and may become develop in time as the need for 
immigrant labor becomes evident to the general public.  For now it is best considered in terms of 
those who are radically opposed to immigration (supporters of right-wing extremist parties) and 
those who are either marginally opposed, neutral, or in favor.    
Immigration in France is most certainly contributing to changes in social cleavages, as is 
clearly affirmed in Baldersheim & Daloz (2003, p. 5).  They explain that these changing 
cleavages in turn explain the shifting party patterns in France as well in other European states 
(Ibid., p. 14).  The immigration-induced cleavages in France are consistent with those described 
in the previous section: immigrants versus non-immigrants and immigrant opponents versus the 
rest of society.  The affaire du foulard, assimilation problems, and the violence in the banlieues 
in 2005 all indicate that a serious rift is forming between immigrants and non-immigrant, 
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regardless of the citizenship status of the former group.  To overcome this cleavage would 
require the French government to be more proactive in targeting the welfare of immigrants with 
social programs and in educating citizens about the true causes of problems like unemployment.  
The biggest challenge to this is, of course, political opinion.  This brings us back to theories 
about immigration in recipient states.  As per power resources theory, France must delicately 
balance all sides in order to maintain some semblance of stability.  Negative public opinion could 
be overcome if France were to allow for formation of more interest groups, yet this runs contrary 
to the principles that established the 5th Republic.  France generally dissuades interest group 
formation by giving them little to no funding and “keep[ing] them at arm‟s length” to limit their 
influence (Janoski, Alford, Hicks, & Schwartz, 2005, p. 648).  Without support, few such groups 
have cropped up on their own, including the Federation of Association of Solidarity with 
Immigrant Workers (Ibid., p. 633).   
There is also a cleavage between opponents of immigration and those who are less vocal 
about the issue or are apathetic.  The existence of the Front National indicates that a certain 
portion of the population holds radical views about immigration, thus contributing to a cleavage.  
Since its formation in the 1970s, FN has run with slogans like “Give France back to the French” 
and “Two million immigrants are the cause of two million French people without work” 
(Oommen, 2002, p. 89).  Although Jean Marie Le Pen argues that the FN is not xenophobic or 
racist some citizens that vote for the party do have these attitudes (Ibid., p. 123).  FN has 
perpetuated the “us” versus “them” fallacy.  Racial and cultural theories contradict Le Pen‟s 
claims: public opinion makes it more difficult for immigrants to integrate and/or they have no 
desire to integrate into a society that treats them with hostility.  Overall, the French case 
exemplifies the theories and descriptions of cleavages caused by immigration presented in the 
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literature.  Cleavages in French society began a natural process of evolution before recent waves 
of immigration had any impact.  For this reason it is possible that they were susceptible to 
interference by politically contentious issues.  France reacts to immigration by balancing the 
interests of powerful groups and parties within the state.  Racial and cultural theories help 
explain public opinion and assimilation problems which complicate the balancing act the 
government must perform.  Overall, immigration in Europe has caused social cleavages to 
change in France, impacting the French political system.  The radical Front National has drawn 
in disillusioned voters from the left and right.  New cleavages have cropped up between 
immigrants and non-immigrants as well as between immigration opponents and the rest of 
society.    
French opinion of immigration from the Maghreb has remained fairly consistent.  Even 
after its colonial period ended, the French attitude toward North Africans remained the same: 
they were viewed as inferior and drastically different from the native population.  This “colonial 
syndrome” led to the permanent association of immigrants with the “violent, repressive, and 
undemocratic” Muslim (Stovall & Van Den Abbeele, 2003,  p. 215).  The reaction of the French 
in response to immigration from the Maghreb has always been marked by racism, xenophobia, 
and discrimination.  The French fear that their culture will be gradually diluted or eventually 
overshadowed by that of the incoming group (Stovall & Van Den Abbeele, 2003  p. 199).  In the 
1980's, a SOFRES MRAP poll found that 49% of French citizens questioned felt that North 
Africans were too different and would not be able to integrate into French society (Feldblum, 
1999).  The same poll also showed that those interviewed believed the number of immigrants to 
be too high.  By the early 1990's, nearly one third of French voters were sympathetic to the anti-
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immigrant cause of the Front National
15
 political party (Cornelius, Martin, & Hollifield, 1994, p. 
165).  In many other countries in Europe, and in the United States, public opinion is increasingly 
against immigration, which seems to be linked to the sheer numbers of immigrants.  Nicholas 
Sarkozy became the French President in 2006, and part of his platform called for tighter border 
controls (Matlack, 2007).  Nonetheless, public opinion seems to have improved somewhat in the 
last few years.  A poll in 2006 by Harris Interactive found that the French had the best public 
opinion of immigration among the major EU powers, with 47% of people claiming there were 
too many immigrants in France (French take the most supportive stance, 2006).   Fewer 
problems with discrimination and racism are being reported by the immigrants themselves, yet it 
is important not to underestimate the “extent of public dissatisfaction with and also xenophobic 
resentment toward France‟s Muslim population” (Benhabib, 2004, p. 198).  
Immigration policies 
 
The French government has responded to North African immigration in a variety of ways.  In 
response to the demographic effects of immigration from the Maghreb, the French government 
enacted policy that aimed at controlling or limiting the numbers of immigrants, regardless of 
legality, that entered the state.  In response to the effects caused by Islam, there are several 
policies that can be described as being religious in nature.  There are several general social 
policies that deal with the remaining social effects of North African immigration in France.  
Finally, France has enacted some policies to address the economic needs of the country as they 
are related to foreign labor.  Messina & Lahav (2006) summarized French policy well by stating 
that it has not “shied away from confrontation with the very regimes that the government is 
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 An extremist right wing party that was established by Jean-Marie Le Pen in 1972.  In 2002, the party managed to 
gather enough votes to make it the second round of the presidential election, which reflected a disturbing extremist 
undercurrent in French politics (France: key facts and figures).     
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suspected of coddling” (p. 265).  This is very true for many of the policies France has utilized in 
an attempt to control the social effects of North African immigration as the government wishes 
to exert some control over the effects of immigration while recognizing that there is some need 
for it to continue.  
Policies of immigration control have evolved since immigration became an influential factor 
in French society.  Policy went from being liberal and encouraging immigration in the late 1950's 
to being protectionist and restricting immigration in the 1970's (Ulman & Eichengreen, 1993, p. 
225).  When the influx first started, the government was very open to the idea and even 
encouraged immigrants to come to France because there was a clear economic need.  In the late 
1960's, agreements were made with Morocco and Tunisia that granted immigrants work 
contracts before they ever left home, but Algerian immigration was already beginning to be 
restricted due to conflicts over the end of the French colonial period there (Money, 1999, p. 111).  
Illegal immigration was allowed, or at least not openly discouraged, until it became clear that 
there were consequences to accepting immigrants into French society (Vogel & Moran, 1991, p. 
114).  At first, policy revolved around naturalizing foreigners and granting amnesty to those who 
had entered illegally.  According to Ireland (1994), “France, in effect, created an ethnic 
minorities problem with far-reaching effects” by establishing this trend in the early years (p. 31).  
Immigrants began to expect that if they managed to stay within France long enough, they would 
be accepted and naturalized, and thus receive permission to stay permanently.  
In 1972, the French government finally made drastic policy changes as public opinion was 
very anti-immigrant in light of the effects French citizens had begun to face (Money, 1999, p. 
106).  The government decided to close France off from further immigration, a task that would 
prove to be impossible.  In order to stop inflows, policies that tightened border controls were put 
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in place, as well as other internal controls, such as “arbitrary identification checks and expulsion 
of undocumented immigrants” (Money, 1999, p. 154).  In 1974, the Giscard Circular, or bill, 
attempted to reduce the number of immigrants coming in by suspending any new immigration 
and putting family reunifications on hold, but these measures were found ineffective and too 
harsh so they repealed in 1975 (Ireland, 1994, p. 48).   
Another strategy the French attempted was the so-called Aide de retour of 1977, which tried 
to encourage North and Sub-Saharan Africans to return to their countries of origin, basically 
through bribery (Ireland, 1994, p. 49).  This too was changed and partially nullified later as very 
few immigrants agreed to leave.  In the 1980's, the development of restrictive policies continued 
as public opinion continued to worsen, and the anti-immigration political party Front National 
was created.  The Barre-Bonnet Laws were established to tighten restrictions against illegal 
migrants and also made deportation easier (Ibid., p. 57).  Following the elections in 1981, 
François Mitterand became the new president and the Barre-Bonnet laws were strengthened and 
extended.  Mitterand, a socialist, promised to “maintain tight controls over new and illegal 
immigration” (Money, 1999, p. 114).  In 1986, the Pasqua law was enacted, which outlined 
conditions for entry into France, and would be expanded in 1993 to also dictate that family 
reunification was dependent on legal residence of the immigrant for two years (Money, 1999, p. 
114). 
 Another period of “zero immigration” began in 1993 when the French Nationality Code was 
revised (Cornelius et al., 1994, p. 149).  Access to French citizenship became more difficult, 
which was intended to discourage immigrants from coming with the intention to stay 
permanently and eventually become French, which contradicts the encouragement of 
assimilation that had taken place in the early years when naturalization was a common 
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occurrence.  Riots were frequent during the early 1990's, but the government felt that it could not 
act to appease the immigrants because public opinion would have surely plummeted (Ireland, 
1994, p. 93).  Instead, they put in place anti-ghetto legislation and provided government housing 
in acceptable location, which fueled the disruptive behavior of a group of immigrants that simply 
refused to assimilate to French customs and culture (Ireland, 1994, p. 97).  More recently, the 
strict Pasqua laws are still in place, and policy continues to be protectionist (Stovall & Van Den 
Abbeele, 2003, p. 207).   
Nicholas Sarkozy, who called the mostly North African rioters of 2005 “scum,” was 
expected to continue to maintain tight immigration controls (Apter, 2007).  His government has 
been working to adhere to immigration quotas and to prioritize acceptance of immigrants on the 
basis of how easily they can be integrated into French society (Integration elusive for France's 
Muslims).  Immigrants with professional degrees are also allowed to enter the country more 
easily than uneducated migrant workers.  In 2007, Sarkozy established the Ministry of 
Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-development to fight illegal immigration, 
encourage development of immigrant-sending states, promote integration of immigrants, and to 
preserve French culture and heritage (Le Ministère: Missions and role, 2008). 
Aside from immigration-controlling policies, there are several others that deal 
specifically with the effects that Islam has had on France.  According to Laurence & Vaisse 
(2006), “the campaign being led to demand that Muslims distance themselves from Islam 
presupposes the very thing that it seeks to denounce, namely that religious sentiment necessarily 
leads to a lack of national identity and ethnic separatism” (xiii).  The Islamic presence in France 
made itself known long before immigration ever became an issue in France.  The Mosque of 
Paris was established in the 1920's, along with the Muslim Hospital and the Muslim Institute.  
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The institutions were supposed to interpret Islam according to the ideals of the French republic 
(Stovall & Van Den Abbeele, 2003, p. 217).  Since then, the construction of new mosques must 
be approved by the government, and they often are only allowed in the banlieues, not in the city 
center (Laurence & Vaisse, 2006).  Determining where they can build and when gives the French 
some control over the visibility of the Muslim religion in its cities.  However, mosques are not 
the most problematic emblem of Islam that the French have encountered.  
Ireland (1994) demonstrated that Muslims in France “largely resisted both homeland and 
French efforts of coordination and control,” which is made clear by l’affaire du foulard, or the 
scarf affair (p. 70).  In response to the expulsion of the three scarf-wearing Muslim girls from 
school in 1989, the government reaffirmed the principle of laïcité
16
 while still leaving some 
room for interpretation of what constitutes religious symbols or clothing (Benhabib, 2004, p. 
185).  In 1994, it was determined that the law was not specific enough as the problem continued.  
The Bayrou guidelines gave students permission to wear discreet symbols that could be easily 
hidden, such as a necklace with a cross, but religious attire like the Muslim veil was not 
acceptable (Benhabib, 2004, p. 190).  The Stasi Commission met in 2003 to study the French 
concept of laïcité and determine how much of a threat headscarves were to secularism.  The 
Commission argues that it is important to look at this issue in the context of the historical 
evolution of laïcité; France did not just decide to ban headscarves in schools on a whim.  France 
began the transition to secularism in state and public institutions in 1793 in the midst of the 
second French Revolution and the Reign of Terror (Kreis, 2000).   
In the present day, relatively few Muslim choose to wear the hijab in France, which may 
be the reason that the few who do face greater discrimination and societal pressure.  In 2004, the 
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 See footnote # 4 on page 7 for a definition. 
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French National Assembly voted to ban the wearing of all religious symbols in elementary and 
secondary schools (Laurence & Vaisse, 2006, p. 163).  The goal of law 2004-228 of 15 March 
2004 was to take a step toward protecting the public sphere, beginning with schools where young 
Muslim children could be educated in French values away from the influence of their families 
and religion (Ulusoy, 2007).  The idea is that by taking the veil out of the picture, French society 
will be more tolerant of the Muslim minority, thus facilitating integration and curbing the 
xenophobic trend
17
.  The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) directly has found the law of 
15 March 2004 to be compatible with its stated objectives and has not made any efforts to 
overturn it.  The devastating riots that occurred around Paris in 2005 happened after the ban was 
put in place, indicating that the ban may have contributed to security threats (outright violence in 
the streets in the face of integration problems) rather than reducing them.  Finally, in 2009 the 
French government began drafting a policy to ban full-veils of the niqab-type in public arenas.  It 
is expected that the ban will be written into law sometime in 2010.  Although there may be some 
sort of backlash from the Muslim community, some Muslims in France agree that wearing the 
niqab is extreme (War on French dressing). 
Despite its secular policies, France has shown concern about alienating its Muslim 
population, and it has made efforts to make up for the inequality experienced by many by 
establishing a French Council of the Muslim Religion in 2002.  This council ensures that 
Muslims have official representation that can negotiate for them on important issues (Laurence 
& Vaisse, 2006, p. 8).  Another way in which the French government compensates is by making 
sure that the brightest of the immigrant youth are placed into the best universities in the country, 
which is similar to affirmative action in the United States.  Overall, French policy toward the 
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 Increased support for the radical right party Front National reflects this trend (Wolfreys, 2010). 
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effect of Muslim immigration has been repressive most of the time, but also shows signs of 
tolerance, as long as the religion respects laïcité.  
The next set of policies concerns a variety of other effects that immigration from the 
Maghreb has on the French society, specifically, problems relating to integration that have 
contributed to racism, discrimination, and xenophobia in France.  In 1968, the Grenelle Accords 
were one of the first instances where policy was used in response to a social effect of 
immigration, and in this case it was the development of ghettos, called bidonvilles, that prompted 
action (Ireland, 1994, p. 41).  The accords destroyed these shanty towns and called for the 
creation of habitations à loyer modéré, or low-rent housing (Ibid., p. 42).  By the late 1970's, 
public housing was once again an issue as there were not enough homes available and the 
conditions in them were often inhospitable.  The “Seventh Plan,” which lasted from 1975 to 
1981, attempted to allow more family reunification while simultaneously reducing illegal 
immigration (Ibid., p. 48).  Then Mitterrand took over the presidency, and the situation improved 
somewhat.  His main goal was to create policies that would help integrate those immigrants 
already in France into society, and he did so by establishing liberal family reunification policies, 
strengthening protection against discrimination, eliminating deportation without due process, 
offering one last chance for regularization of illegal migrants, and creating the Association Law 
to allow foreign associations to be formed more easily and to make them eligible for public aid 
(Ibid., p. 61-63).   
The Socialist party continued this trend by emphasizing common ground and 
understanding between French citizens and foreigners and also by highlighting immigrant issues.  
In a move that targeted North Africans, the French Nationality Code was revised, and made more 
restrictive, in 1987 under Jacques Chirac (Feldblum, 1999, p. 19).  In order to protect French 
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nationalism, the revised Code included the concept of having a volonté
18
, or desire, to be French, 
which implied that immigrants must truly want to become French and be willing to sacrifice at 
least part of their former identities.  In 1990, a High Council for the Integration of Immigrants 
was created as a response to social unrest.  A 5-year plan was also devised to reduce the 
problems growing in the suburbs, such as financial disparities and segregation of certain 
immigrant groups (Ireland, 1994, p. 94).  Debate over the Nationality Code flared up again in 
1993 when further revisions were demanded in light of the apparent threat of Muslim North 
African immigration that had become more obvious as tensions escalated.  This time around, 
much harsher changes were called for, most of which were directly linked to the issues of 
naturalization and citizenship of Franco-Algerians and their children (Cornelius et al., 1994, p. 
154).  In 1998, the Guigou bill changed the Nationality Code once again by dictating that a youth 
who has immigrant parents but was born in France will be eligible for French citizenship upon 
reaching the age of majority, 18, if they have lived in France for five years prior to their 
eighteenth birthday (Feldblum, 1999, p. 153).  These young adults were also granted the 
opportunity to forfeit their right to citizenship if they should choose to.   
In recent years, a few more policies have been established that can be viewed as 
beneficial for immigrants.  In 2003, Sarkozy partially eliminated the law that stated that non-
citizens could face expulsion from the country after serving time in jail for crimes committed in 
France (Laurence & Vaisse, 2006, p. 189).  Sarkozy also encouraged the creation of priority 
education zones in areas that have large immigrant populations in order to justify the 
appropriation of additional funding to problematic areas (Laurence & Vaisse, 2006, p. 184).  An 
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 Feldblum (1999) describes volonté  in this context as referring to “both the individual‟s manifestations to 
participate, and to the imperatives of the collective will which dictates that sameness overrides difference” (p. 74). 
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anti-discrimination agency, HALDE, was created in 2004 to help provide legal counsel and 
mediation services to all persons facing such issues, including immigrants (Ibid., p. 61).  While 
social policy in France has varied greatly both in effectiveness and in intended outcome, there 
certainly has been no shortage of action on the part of the government to respond and attempt to 
control the far-reaching effects of North African immigration.     
When it comes to economic policies of immigration, France has often been less active 
than with social policy.  The first obvious economic policy was the expulsion of a group of North 
African workers in 1968, in response to a workers strike by immigrants that was particularly 
problematic (Ireland, 1994, p. 41).  By simply forcing the strikers to leave, it was assumed that 
immigrants would understand the consequences and not risk striking again.  Of course, this was a 
complete failure as strikes continued to be the preferred method of protest among migrant groups 
since they realized that it would get the government‟s attention.  In the late 1960's and into the 
70's, the government began to decentralize its economic base within Paris in an effort to alleviate 
the growing problems the city faced, such as strain on public services and the immense growth of 
the banlieues brought on by immigration (Money, 1999, p. 125).  Paris is still a hub of economic 
activity today, but other regions of the country benefitted from the decentralization and the 
immediate concerns of overburdening Paris were pacified to some extent.   
The policy process continued when the Marcellin Circular, 1972, attempted to merge the 
procedures for obtaining work permits and being granted residency (Money, 1999, p. 111).  The 
same year, the Fontanet Circular was enacted which sought to tighten the rules for hiring foreign 
labor and to regularize the employment of illegal migrants that took place frequently (Ulman and 
Eichengreen, 1993, p. 234).  It also “subordinated recruitment of foreigners to domestic labor 
market conditions by requiring employers to advertise available positions for a minimum of three 
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weeks at the National Employment Agency before requesting an immigrant worker” from the 
National Immigration Office (Money, 1999, p. 111).  Employers rejected the policy as it made 
things too difficult for them, and it was not successful.  All immigration of workers into France 
was stopped from 1974 to 1975, and when the ban was lifted, new laws controlling flows were 
continually put in place to make rules stricter for incoming immigrants seeking employment 
(Ibid., p. 112).  Work permits became more and more difficult to procure throughout the 1980's, 
especially for non-Europeans.  The Auroux Laws of 1992 gave more labor rights to immigrants, 
which allowed the habitual labor strikes to become more civilized (less violence in the streets) 
and easier to resolve (Ireland, 1994, p. 62).  The French economy slipped into a recession in 
1992-1993, which aggravated immigrant-related issues. However, the government focused on 
controlling the out-of-control social problems that ensued.  Today, certain types of jobs are 
prohibited for non-EU nationals, or even from all foreigners, such as positions in the private 
sector, civil service jobs, state enterprises, and freelance professions (Wrench et al., 1999, p. 80). 
Assessment of human security 
 
Overall, it seems clear that there are some basic human security concerns in France regarding 
the North African immigrant population.  Although immigrants may be better off than they were 
in their home countries, full freedom from fear and freedom from want are not being achieved at 
the same level as they are for French citizens of non-immigrant backgrounds.  Beginning with 
freedom from fear, there are challenges relating to the conflict between Islam and the secularism 
of the French state.  Muslim women and girls in particular are asked to forgo wearing veils in 
school and the niqab (voile integrale) in other public places.  Inevitably, some women are likely 
to be afraid of the religious and familial repercussions of abiding by French regulations.  Women 
living in banlieues may be forced to remain within them for shelter and girls may be 
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homeschooled or sent to Islamic schools instead of being allowed to mix with students of 
different backgrounds.  This will hinder integration of the Muslim female minority and does not 
achieve the French goal of assimilation of its immigrant population into French culture.  Granted, 
there is only so much the government can do to eliminate fear.  The solution may be for the 
government to provide assistance to families that cannot afford to send their daughters to private 
Islamic schools, which will allow the government to maintain secularism in the public sphere but 
will not force women to abandon religious practices.   
 Similarly, the very existence of the banlieues and the social and political problems rooted 
within them are cause for concern over the protection of human security, both in terms of 
freedom from fear and freedom from want.  Although the violent riots in these neighborhoods 
have mostly resulted in property damage, there is always the risk that innocent bystanders will be 
injured or killed when cars are set fire and Molotov cocktails thrown.  Many of the perpetrators 
of these acts of violence were French citizens whose parents had immigrated.  Because they do 
not feel the French government recognizes and is doing enough to help them (in terms of 
unemployment and supplying adequate social services to the banlieues) they choose to express 
themselves in ways the government cannot ignore.  As a result, public opinion amongst non-
immigrant French citizens remains quite negative, which in turn makes policymaking in favor of 
immigrants more difficult.  France seems to be stuck in an immigration trap in which 
policymaking seems to be unable to appease both sides.  It may be that without some sort of 
international cooperation or regulations coming from a higher power (the EU), immigration 
policy in France will remain virtually paralyzed.      
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Spain 
 
Immigration Profile 
 
Spain‟s historical experiences with immigration differ significantly from those of France.  
It was a country of emigration throughout the early 1970's; Spaniards often immigrated to other 
countries including France to serve as guest workers.  Spain became a country of immigration 
relatively recently because of three historical events: its authoritarian leader General Franco died 
1975, Spain transitioned to democracy, and it was admitted into the EU in 1986.  The workers 
returning to Spain from other European countries helped boost the economy and the demand for 
labor grew dramatically.  Immigrants from nearby North African countries and others in Latin 
America with which the state had strong historical ties were attracted to this development and 
began to arrive in droves.   
Discussions of immigration in Spain are most often characterized by a numbers game: 
how many are coming, from where, and what percentage entered illegally?  Because the 
numbers
19
 are so often in flux it is hard to pin these figures down, but it is important to consider 
the estimates to understand how immigration in Spain has evolved.  From 1983 to 1993, the 
number of foreigners in Spain increased 105%, from 210,350 to 430,422 (Wrench et al., 1999, p. 
175).  Legal immigration continued to increase steadily throughout the 1990s as evidenced by 
various statistics.  Then from 1998 to 2000, there was a drastic increase from 57,000 to 600,000, 
in part because of economic growth and pro-immigration policies in Spain (Matlack, 2007).  This 
surge made Spain one of the leading immigrant-importing countries in Europe.  In 2003, “Spain 
received more than a third of the immigrants to the 25 EU member states” as a whole, with the 
African total alone reaching 433,000 (Carling, 2007b, p. 8).  As of early 2007, 11% of Spain‟s 
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total population of 44 million people was foreign-born, compared to 12.9% in the United States 
(Matlack, 2007).  In an interesting historical twist, numbers of immigrants arriving in Spain have 
recently decreased from 13,000 in 2008 to just more than 7,000 last year due to the economic 
crisis (Bryant, 2010).  It took a severe global economic crisis to slow down rates of new arrivals, 
but the effects of immigration remain.  It is assumed that the numbers will increase again once 
the Spanish economy recovers, but policymaking may be able to affect how soon this happens 
and how high the numbers will be. 
Moroccans have long constituted the largest non-European immigrant group with 
681,829 registered immigrants as of December 2008 (Estadísticas).  In 2003, Ecuadorians
20
 
surpassed Moroccans temporarily (Cornelius et al., 1994, p. 332; Baldwin-Edwards, 2004).  
Recent data shows that they are once again the dominant group: as of 2009 there were 4,715,757 
foreigners living in Spain, including 758,174 Moroccans, 728,580 Romanians, 441,455 
Ecuadorians, and 288,255 Colombians (Tedesco, 2010, p. 2).  The large number of Romanians is 
due to the 2007 EU enlargement which now allows them to travel freely within Europe. 
There are no entirely reliable statistics for the numbers of unauthorized immigrants in 
Spain, only a multitude of educated guesses based on what little data is available.  What is clear, 
however, is that there are fewer illegal immigrants today than in the past, in part due to 
legalization policies enacted by the Spanish government.  Total numbers increased by an 
estimated 3.4 times between 1990 and 1998 and 2.0 times between 1998 and 2005 (Estadísticas).  
Geddes (2000) estimates 200,000 to 300,000 arrived in Southern Europe in 1993 alone (p. 24).  
In 1996, the Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración, or the Permanent Immigration 
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Observatory, estimated that in 1996 Spain had between 50,000 and 65,000 illegal migrants enter 
the state, but according to King, Lazardis, & Tsardanidis (2000), these numbers were on the low 
side (p. 260).  The total number of unauthorized immigrants in Spain prior to the financial crisis 
was approximately 800,000 (Arango & Martin, 2005).  The government legalized approximately 
600,000 immigrants since 1986 through four different programs, with a significant proportion of 
them being of Moroccan origin (Ibid.).  Because of the Schengen agreements, once immigrants 
entered Spain (legally or not) they able to move about Europe as they please.  For this reason, 
Spain has endured political pressure from neighboring countries (France in particular) and the 
EU to better control its borders.   
There are aspects of North African immigration in Spain that should be considered 
further to develop a full profile of the situation in the country: unauthorized immigration and 
integration.  To begin, we must return to the contentious issue of illegal immigration and move 
beyond the numbers.  Unauthorized immigration is extremely problematic in Southern Europe 
and occurs in higher volumes than in the North due to closer proximity to the Maghreb.  
Complex smuggling networks, called the “Moroccan Mafias,” are sometimes arranged by highly 
organized criminal groups, while others are planned by simple fishermen (Carling, 2007b, p. 
223).   Regardless of how they work, these networks often manage to bring those who can afford 
it into Spain.  From Spain, these migrants are able to move relatively easily to other parts of 
Europe, thanks to the Schengen agreements.  Other groups reach Spain in pateras, which are 
rickety little boats that capsize easily, therefore making them a dangerous choice only attempted 
by the most desperate (King, Lazardis, & Tsardanidis, 2000, p. 260).  There are two routes that 
those in pateras often take: across the Strait of Gibraltar or from Western Morocco to the Canary 
Islands.  Crossing the Strait is more dangerous due to rougher waters, but is much quicker as 
37 
 
reaching the Canary Islands can take from 20 hours to upwards of a few days, depending on the 
weather (Carling, 2007b, p. 25).  Another more difficult, but less dangerous, way to arrive in 
Spain is by entering the Spanish cities of Melilla and Ceuta.  Many try to simply climb the fences 
that separate the cities from Morocco and die in the process.  Others secure forged documents 
and make it into the cities, where they wait until passage to the mainland can be arranged (Ibid., 
p. 24).  Between 1997 and 2001, approximately 4,000 Moroccans died attempting to reach Spain 
(Messina & Lahav, 2006, p. 563).   
Integration problems in Spain are not as problematic as in France, though that is not to 
say they do not exist.  Immigrants are less concentrated than in France, which makes integration 
problems less acute.  There is also considerable regional variability in Spain, which has 
encouraged tolerance of diversity.  Spanish policy has never been to make immigrants become 
Spanish, and citizenship requirements are based primarily on lineage or legal residency in Spain 
(Informacíon sobre el desarrollo del reglamento…, 2005).  To explain the Spanish xenophobia 
toward Muslims that is seen in Spain, one must look back to the centuries the peninsula spent 
under control of the Moors (Encarnacíon, 2004, p. 172).  This perceived dark period of Spanish 
history is something that the state will not let be forgotten.  The Spanish also recall the harsh 
treatment of the Moors as they were expelled from the continent.  However, this has not 
prevented Spaniards from reacting toward immigrants from North Africa with violence on 
occasion, such as occurred in 2000 in the city of El Ejido (Ibid., p. 172).  The 11 March 2004 
bombings of the Atocha train station in Madrid were linked to a Moroccan al Qaeda cell, which 
has also contributed to anti-immigrant sentiments.   
Although immigrants are generally able to integrate into Spanish society more easily than 
in France, they do face some challenges.  Immigrants are often unable to afford suitable housing, 
38 
 
and are often isolated in poorer neighborhoods, keeping them isolated from the rest of the 
population as in the French banlieues (King et al., 2000, p. 120).  Migrants benefit from the 
welfare system and social services in Spain and their children are allowed access to public 
schools.  As a result, they are frequently blamed for utilizing resources that belong to Spanish 
citizens.  Crime is another social effect of migration from the Maghreb, and in 1991 it was 
recorded that 15% of all crimes were committed by foreigners, with a vast majority of those 
being petty theft (Cornelius et al., 1994, p. 367).  The social effects of North African 
immigration in Spain are just beginning to be understood, but it is very clear how the public feels 
about them. 
Most of those who do not stay in Spain use it as a country of transit on their way to places 
like Italy or France.  Their primary motivation is economic: they move in order to better provide 
for themselves and their families.  Despite persistent high unemployment rates in Spain over the 
last twenty years, migrants have increasing come for this reason, as is supported by the amount 
of remittances sent back to Morocco: from Spain alone in 2006 the total was $691,848,000, a 
substantial portion of the Moroccan GDP (Moroccan migration to Spain, 2007; Morocco, 2009).  
In comparison, Spain gave Morocco $4.3 million in bilateral development assistance in the same 
year (Humanitarian donor profile, 2009).   
The Spanish economy also appears to be significantly impacted by North African 
immigration as it is dependent on foreign labor.  Following its transition from being labor-
exporting to being labor-importing, the Spanish economy experienced a boom, and the need for 
immigration expanded overnight.  When many Spaniards repatriated, they no longer wanted to 
work in the low-paying service and agricultural sectors, which left a void in the labor market that 
desperately needed to be filled (Cornelius et al., 1994, p. 342).  Spain‟s economy gradually 
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became more open, and began to rely more heavily on certain industries, such as tourism, trade, 
and shipping (King et al., 2000, p. 9).  These sectors of the economy require a more flexible 
labor force that can work seasonally, jumping from profession to profession as the market 
demands.  Jobs in these sectors are often low-paying, insecure, and can be relatively dangerous.  
Nonetheless, immigrant workers are more willing to accept these positions.  Agricultural work is 
another popular option for many immigrants as they can move around the agricultural regions in 
Southern and Western Spain, harvesting seasonal crops.  In the case of illegal migrants, they 
really have no other choice as they are usually unable to secure other types of work (King et al., 
2000, p. 10).   
The Spanish economy began to promote its large supply of cheap labor in order to 
increase foreign investment.  When gaps in the labor market began to appear, Spain filled them 
with immigrants to continue to fuel growth.  Workforce participation rates of Spanish women in 
Spain are relatively low at 34% compared to the EU average of 59%, further increasing reliance 
on immigrant labor (Messina & Lahav, 2006, p. 363).  Finally, Spain has a low birthrate, and it 
will continue not to provide enough labor to meet its needs in the future.  The population in 
Morocco is relatively young, with 23% of the population between 0 to 15 years old and 76% 
between 16 and 64 years old (Moroccan Migration to Spain, 2007).  This age structure is 
favorable for providing Spain with a lasting source of foreign labor to meet its needs into the 
future.  According to Josep Oliver from the Autónoma University in Barcelona, the Spanish have 
collectively “decided not to have children, and without knowing it, [they] decided to have 
immigrants” (Huddled against the masses, 2006). Many immigrants send money home to support 
their families, making some developing states dependent on remittances from Spain.  As long as 
North African development is not sufficient to meet the needs of its population, there will 
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continue to be migrants. Although Spain‟s economy clearly has a need for foreign labor, it is 
experiencing some noticeable effects of bringing in so many immigrant workers.   
Whether or not they are the actual cause, foreign workers in Spain are often blamed for 
the depressed wages and unemployment of the native workforce.  Unemployment is a serious 
problem in Spain, in 1999 more than three million people were out of work, and rather than look 
at the real issues behind the problem, many people choose to simply blame the foreigners that 
come in looking for work (Wrench et al., 1999, p. 179).  In reality, job competition with 
immigrants is neither the cause of high unemployment among Spaniards nor is it as big of a 
problem as citizens perceive it to be and “as a rule, immigrants take jobs disregarded by the 
native workforce, jobs that tend to be less stable, less skilled, less protected, and less paid,” 
(King, Lazardis, & Tsardanidis, 2000, p. 7, 264).  Immigrant labor complements native Spanish 
labor in the market.   
The last complaint of Spanish citizens is that immigrants are a drain on the welfare 
system.  The government has stated that the tax and social security contributions made by 
immigrants more than cover the costs of services they use.  In the early 1990s, tensions between 
natives and immigrants on all above these issues increased.  It is possible that this could occur 
now in the post-financial crisis environment if the Spanish economy is unable to make a quick 
recovery.  For the moment, conflicts have been minimal.  Overall, the Spanish economy is better 
off having immigrant labor, even though the stigma placed upon these foreigners by the native 
population makes the situation seem to be more problematic than it actually is. 
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Policymaking process variables: political structure, cleavages, and public opinion 
 
Unlike in France, contemporary Spanish politics are based on a constitution and history 
that only go back as far as the late 1970s.  It is also lacking a revolutionary past, which has 
played a considerable role in French politics.  From the end of the authoritarian Franco regime to 
the present parliamentary democracy, Spain has been engaged in an evolutionary political 
process.  Spain was able to complete its transition to democracy in spite of having a feeble 
political party system (McLaren, 2008, p. 19).  The Spanish Constitution created a federalist 
system with significant power delegated to the autonomous communities.  After a couple 
decades of change, the political system does appear to be somewhat stable at this point, though 
outside forces like the European Union may be have facilitated progress.  At the national level, 
Spain has a two-party system with one dominant party on the left (PSOE, the Socialist Party) and 
another on the right (PP, the People‟s Party) (Franklin, Mackie, & Valen, 1992, p. 327).  The PP 
has evolved over time from a coalition government that included the Popular Alliance and other 
smaller center-right parties.  This shows that political parties in Spain are not static, but it is 
unclear if they transform or disappear as often as in France.   
There are also strong regional parties in Spain, which is reflective of the country‟s 
internal cultural diversity which led to the creation of the Autonomous Communities.  Regional 
political parties have been long established: “around 1900, the Catalan… and significant parts of 
the Basque middle classes and peasantry turned to regionalist and separatist parties to fight the 
parasitic central administration identified with the economically backward center of the nation” 
(Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 42).  More recently, the regional parties have been rejuvenated by a 
trend toward ethno-nationalism that spread throughout Europe as well as in response to 
repression the regions experienced under the Franco regime (Franklin, Mackie, & Valen, 1992, 
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p. 328).  Regionalism in Spain has contributed a couple sets of cleavages: industrial versus 
agricultural economies, cleavages according to socioeconomic status, and cleavages based on 
language.  In Spain, the industrial center is Barcelona, though cities in the Basque country and 
other places in the North also have strong economies.  In comparison, the south and center of the 
country are still more focused on agriculture.  This influences political participation as the two 
sides have varied interest.  Closely related are cleavages based on socioeconomic status.  Those 
living in the more economically prosperous regions of Spain tend to be better off than those 
living in the agrarian South.  Finally, there are social cleavages based on language, though this is 
most visible within regional politics.  While the majority in Catalonia speaks Catalan, those who 
do not may not choose a party based on this fact.   
As in France, social changes have contributed to the development of political parties.  
From the time of the „Spanish miracle‟ under Franco‟s liberalization plan and continuing with 
the economic growth of the 1980s, Spaniards have turned away from agriculture and are better 
educated than before (Franklin, Mackie, & Valen, 1992, p. 330).  In the 1980s segments of the 
population returned from abroad where they had been participating in guest-worker programs.  
This led to the Europeanization and modernization of Spanish society.  Spain too became more 
secular, though much more modestly than France.    Cleavages that play an important role in 
Spanish politics, based on data from the 1980s, include: linguistic divisions (tied to the regions), 
age, occupation, religion, class identification, and political ideology (Ibid., p. 41, 332-336).   
There is significant attention paid to regional cleavages in Spain, especially in certain 
regions like Catalonia.  The high degree of autonomy given to the communities reflects a higher 
degree of respect for multiculturalism.  The “decay” of the nation state which is causing political 
changes in France may also be occurring in Spain, but it is unclear to what degree.  In spite of 
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conflicts and negative opinions toward immigration, Spain does not have a radical right-wing 
anti-immigrant political party like France‟s Front National (Encarnacíon, 2004, p. 169).  Given 
that immigration is one of the most important issues on the Spanish political agenda, this is 
somewhat surprising without consideration of the historical and political reasons behind it.  
Encarnación‟s explanation is that the political culture that was established in Spain post-Franco 
was deliberately crafted to discourage political extremism (2004, p. 12).  Its recent experience 
with Fascism keeps extremist parties at bay, with the exception of the Basque “Eskadi ta 
Askatasuma,” or ETA (Ibid., p. 177).  Spain does have minor political parties on the far left and 
right, but most of them are fragmented and none of them are concerned with immigration issues.      
Immigration seems to have a much more modest impact on social cleavages in Spain than 
in France, as is evidenced by the comparatively sparse literature on the subject.  Party politics 
were still developing when immigration issues began to develop in Spain.  As indicated by 
McLaren, “there appear to have been no major potentially divisive societal cleavages to represent 
in the new Spanish democracy” after its formation (2008, p. 140).  Thus, at least at the 
beginning, it was more important to consider the role of the elites and the interests they claimed 
to represent.  Because Spain started with relatively minor cleavages to begin with, it has not been 
possible for immigration to cause sweeping changes.  Larger internal concerns put immigration 
on the back burner for nearly a decade and only in recent years do they seem to be affecting 
politics.  Coupled with a mild political arena and historical warning against radicalism, Spain 
appears to be avoiding some of the problems with immigration that have cropped up in France.  
However, it does seem that there is potential for a social cleavage between immigrants and non-
immigrants to develop if conflicts between the two sides increase.  If public opinion becomes 
increasingly pessimistic or should increasing numbers of immigrants eventually lead to a drain 
44 
 
on social services, then it is possible that the situation in Spain could change to more closely 
resemble that of France and we may see more significant changes in cleavages appear 
(Encarnacíon, 2004, p. 176). 
France reacts to immigration by balancing the interests of powerful groups and parties 
within the state.  Racial and cultural theories help explain public opinion and assimilation 
problems which complicate the balancing act the government must perform.  In Spain, the power 
resources argument also rings true, but the Spanish society is more easily appeased than the 
French for various historical and cultural reasons.  Cost-benefit theories play a larger role than 
cultural or racial considerations because Spaniards do not view immigration to be as serious of a 
problem as do the French. New cleavages have cropped up between immigrants and non-
immigrants as well as between immigration opponents and the rest of society.  In Spain, 
immigration does not seem to have made as dramatic an impact.  One could argue that the 
beginning of a cleavage between immigrants and non-immigrants is forming as instances of 
violence have occurred from both sides.  
In Spain, immigration from less desirable areas, including North Africa, has become a 
“social fact” and is considered problematic by Spanish society (Wrench, Rea, & Ouali, 1999, p. 
176).  North African immigrants are excluded from society by Spanish citizens, further lessening 
any hope that they could eventually integrate into society.  Of all immigrant groups, the least 
accepted are North African Arabs, and 58% of Spanish citizens agreed that social integration of 
the group was poor (Cornelius et al., 1994, p. 359).  In 1991, 33% of Spaniards believed that 
there were too many foreigners in their country, but by 1994 the percentage had decreased to 28 
(Cornelius et al., 1994, p. 358).  As of 2006, the number had risen drastically to 68% of 
Spaniards believing there were too many immigrants in Spain, partially because of the terrorist 
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attacks in March 2004 (France takes the most supportive stance, 2006).  Spanish citizens have 
always been quick to blame foreigners for making social and economic problems in Spain worse.  
Sixty percent of Spaniards blame the government for their immigration woes (Huddled against 
the masses, 2006).  Another 54% believe that immigration is the most serious problem Spain 
currently faces (Crawford, 2005, p. 6).  Finally, a very recent poll by Harris Interactive taken in 
the summer of 2007 found that 42% of Spanish citizens feel that immigration is helping their 
country (Matlack, 2007).  It seems clear that the Spanish are against the effects of immigration, 
but many do acknowledge that it is helping Spain to have these foreigners there.     Perhaps 
because of its toleration of regional differences, Spain seems most concerned with balancing the 
opinion of its citizens with its need for immigrant labor to fill gaps in the market.  In periods of 
relatively low (for Spain) unemployment, public opinion tends to be neutral to favorable toward 
immigration in Spain.  However, the worse the numbers get, the more the public calls for 
increased immigration controls.  It is in these periods that power resource theory becomes 
applicable in the balancing of interests among groups.  Spain conducts cost-benefit analysis to 
determine how to appease public opinion while still maintaining sufficient levels of immigration 
to fulfill the needs of the labor market.   
Immigration policies 
 
Immigration policy in Spain has traditionally been different from that of France.  Until 
recently, the Spanish motto seems to be exactly as The Economist described it: “when 
immigration policy fails, try giving up” (Huddled against the masses, 2006).  Although the 
Spanish began to devise some sort of rough outline of their intended immigration policy before 
the first pateras ever arrived, the efficacy of their policies is rather questionable.  Nonetheless, 
Spain‟s situation in many cases serves as a direct contrast for how France chooses to deal with its 
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immigration problem.  Social policy in Spain can be divided into two categories: policies that 
respond to the demographic effects of immigration, and the very limited category of policies that 
intend to deal with integration of immigrants. 
The first policy enacted by Spain was not motivated by the effects of immigration, as at 
the time the influx was only just beginning.  This is still worth mentioning because it forms the 
basis for the rest of Spain‟s immigration policy.  The Ley de extranjería, also known as the Ley 
Orgánica or Organic Law, was established in 1985 as a prerequisite for membership of the 
European Union.  There were a few different versions of the law
21
 but with respect to the 
anticipated social effects of immigration, it originally outlined basic rules for entry and residence 
of foreigners (King et al., 2000, p. 266).  Since Spain began to admit immigrants rather quickly, 
developing policies to control immigrant inflows was its main priority for many years.  To deal 
with those who had already entered, regularization programs registered those who had non-
European origins in 1985-1986 and again in 1991-1992 (King et al., 2000, p. 108).  The 1991 
program mostly benefitted Moroccan immigrants, who also faced a new visa requirement that 
same year, along with migrants from the rest of the Maghreb (Cornelius et al., 1994, p. 350).  
The goal was to make it more difficult for North Africans to come into Spain, and while it may 
have stopped some, others began to consider illegal ways of entering.   
Spain‟s relationship with the Maghreb was always a factor in how it established 
immigration policy, and in how restrictive it chose to be.  Spain constantly was afraid of 
destabilization in the region as that would have inevitably caused them more problems not only 
with immigration but also in its economic and political relationships with the states of the 
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Maghreb (Gillespie & Youngs, 2001, p. 132).  In 1993, Spain encouraged Morocco to help stop 
the smuggling of soon-to-be illegal immigrants who attempted to cross the Strait of Gibraltar in 
pateras (Cornelius et al., 1994, p. 337).  As the 1990's went on, Spain continued to strengthen its 
border controls, deport some illegal entrants (always as a last resort), and expand the visa 
requirement to other states.  In 1996 another regularization program was attempted, this time to 
help the family members of immigrants, but it was not very effective and few people took 
advantage of it (King et al., 2000, p. 259).  The government established the Integrated System of 
External Vigilance in 1999 to guard the southern borders from immigrant arrivals by patera.  
This system was basically an advanced radar that could detect the small boats and would warn 
the Guardia Civil in advance of their arrivals so that the immigrants could immediately be taken 
into custody when they reached the shore (Carling, 2007a, p. 325).   
Progress continued with the revision of the Organic Law in 2000 (Ley Orgánica 4/2000) 
to recognize immigration as a permanent social phenomenon.  Foreigners also received more 
social rights in Spain and a new regularization method was established which would allow 
immigrants to register provided they had lived in Spain for two years without interruption and 
had also registered in their municipality (Laubenthal, 2007, p. 114).  Unfortunately, this revision 
was partially revoked the following year when the conservative Partido Popular regained control 
of the Parliament, and illegal immigrants lost some of their rights and deportation once again 
became acceptable (Ibid., p. 115).  A new revision of the old laws was adopted, Article 31.3, 
which established stricter rules for obtaining residency.  Despite the apparent harshness of these 
policies, Spain was still frequently criticized by other European states, including France, for 
being too lenient.  The 600,000 illegal immigrants that received amnesty in 2005 support this 
argument (Crawford, 2005, p. 6).   
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There are fewer illegal immigrants in Spain today due to all of the regularization and 
amnesty programs, but the flows keep coming.  From 2000 to 2007, more than one million 
people received amnesty from the Spanish government (Matlack, 2007).  This certainly must 
appear as an incentive to North Africans and other immigrants that are considering leaving their 
countries of origin. Even after the 2004 Atocha bombings
22
 and external pressure from the EU, 
Spain implemented another round of regularization in 2005.    Attempts at bilateral cooperation
23
 
beginning in 2001 and continuing past the elections of 2004 attempted to reduce the burden of 
regulating migration flows on Spain, which was fairly successful as the problem grew.  The 
Spanish and Moroccan governments have had strained relations from time to time over 
migration-related issues, including a lack of cooperation on the part of Morocco in adhering to 
bilateral agreements (Arango & Martin, 2005). The Plan Africa,
24
 designed to work on 
development of immigrant-sending countries in hopes of reducing immigration flows, has been 
criticized for having the wrong motives and not achieving its goals, though it was not an outright 
failure (Bidaguren and Aurre, 2006).  The concept of co-development behind the plan was 
praised across Europe as being a step in the right direction when it comes to addressing 
immigration.  Spain recently launched a second Plan Africa with hopes of improving upon the 
shortcomings of its predecessor and fostering greater cooperation with African states (Plan 
África 2009-2012, 2009).  Even though Spain appears to have attempted to control immigrant 
flows in response to the demographic effects it is experiencing, in the end these policies have not 
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done much to slow down the influx.  Instead, they seem to just be covering the problem up, and 
not very well at that.  
Social policy that focuses on integration of immigrants into society has been rather 
limited in Spain, especially compared to France, as immigrants are able to be absorbed relatively 
easily.  The original Ley de extranjería did mention the rights of foreigners in Spain, although 
only in a restricted fashion as the problem was not yet a serious concern for the government 
(Wrench et al., 1999, p. 192).  It was not until it became clear that the flows of immigration were 
only going to increase and that these new foreigners were going to continue to affect Spanish 
society that any purely social policies were established.  The Plan for the Social Integration of 
Immigrants was created in 1994 and intended to show the government‟s intention of reducing 
barriers to integration and fighting the negative reactions of the native population (King et al., 
2000, p. 270).  In 1996 and 1997, the government set aside more resources for the agencies that 
were responsible for integration of foreigners.  A study was commissioned in 1998 to study the 
immigration and refugee phenomenon, and plans to revise the Ley de extranjería were 
established (King et al., 2000, p. 272).  With the Organic Law 4/2000, immigrants won more 
social rights and their overall situation improved.  The revisions gave immigrants the same basic 
rights as Spanish citizens, except for the right to vote, and also provided for reunification of 
families (Torns, 2000).  While parts of the law were changed later, such as the fact that illegal 
immigrants lost many of the rights that had been given to them, legal immigrants still benefitted 
from it.  While xenophobia, discrimination, and racism are concerns of the Spanish government, 
more action is taken on these issues at lower levels, such as in trade unions or employers‟ 
organizations, than with actual government policies (Wrench et al., 2000, p. 13).  The 
government tries to balance the problems immigrants are facing with the benefits the economy 
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receives from them.  Giving too much to the immigrants upsets Spaniards, but kicking out all the 
foreigners would devastate the economy, which Spaniards would hate even more.  This delicate 
balancing act will most likely continue as the government does not appear to have much other 
choice. 
While France‟s responses to economic effects of immigration could be considered only 
mildly active in terms of numbers of policies, there have been even fewer enacted in Spain.  
Since the economic effects were mainly positive in Spain, there was less of a need to formulate 
policies.  According to Tedesco (2010), “Spain can be considered a successful model of labour 
integration” because “the labour market‟s capacity for absorption” reduces the need for 
government intervention (p. 3).  The main action that Spain has taken was to restrict immigrants 
“to a specific labor market segment: the black economy of illegal foreigners” (Wrench et al., 
1999, p. 179).  The Ley de Extranjería of 1985 outlined specific conditions for work permits to 
help regulate what kinds of jobs immigrants could take as a means of protecting native workers 
from unemployment.  During the recession in the early 1990's, more Spaniards became willing to 
settle for jobs in construction and other less secure positions, which tapped into the sources of 
employment usually left to immigrants (Cornelius et al., 1994, p. 35).  In light of this situation, 
the government adopted the Resolution of 4 May 1993, which established a system of quotas, 
contigentes, for foreign labor.  This system was specifically designed to only allow in the 
number of workers that Spain has an economic need for while still being able to integrate them 
into society (Cornelius et al., 1994, p. 364).  The quota for 1993 was set at 20,600 permits, and in 
the years that followed it remained close to that initial number (Wrench et al., 1999, p. 181).  The 
quota system did not succeed in reducing the hiring of illegal immigrants, nor did it manage to 
control the influx, but it did cut down on the need for regularizations.  According to a Spanish 
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policymaker, “other EC member states talk about the need for a zero-immigration policy, but this 
is completely unrealistic for Spain” because there is too clear of an economic need for foreign 
labor (Geddes, 2000, p. 25).  For this reason, Spain has carefully sculpted its economic policies 
to allow immigration to continue but it also takes the situation of native labor into account. 
In recent years, there has been discussion of implementation of a circular migration 
policy in Spain.  Circular migration is defined by the EU as “a tool that can both help address 
labor needs in EU member states and maximize the benefits of migration for countries of origin, 
including fostering skills transfers and mitigating the risks of brain drain”   (Circular migration 
and mobility…, 2007).  Work permits established for the Contingente system are sometimes not 
used by immigrants, thus operating in the informal sector of the Spanish economy when they do 
find employment (Moroccan migration to Spain, 2007).  The contracts for migrants to work 
during the strawberry harvest have only been implemented since 2005, but already have proved 
that CM is feasible on a small-scale (Plewa, 2008).  In Cartaya, Spain in 2005 only 5% of the 
contracted workers returned to their countries of origin.  After the government reconsidering its 
strategy, only married female workers with children were recruited and they were not allowed to 
bring their families with them during subsequent contracts.  This provided them with an 
incentive to return home and 85% of the 4,563 workers did so (Newland, et. al., 2008).  This 
important lesson teaches us that CM can work provided we find the right incentives to encourage 
workers to return home when it is time. 
According to the EU, CM has the potential to address migration-related issues 
simultaneously in a more structured manner (Circular migration and mobility…, 2007).   CM 
considers cyclical migration to be a naturally occurring phenomenon and aims to work with it 
while still providing some controls to maximize stakeholder benefits.  Developing states receive 
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assistance through remittances and developed states can benefit from a renewable supply of labor 
that fits the needs of their labor markets.  CM departs from traditional migration control policies 
that view immigration as “linear” and “static” (Workshop on creating development benefits…, 
2008).  The primary benefits of the policy are regulation of the supply of foreign labor to fill 
gaps in the Spanish labor market and the strengthening of human and economic capital for 
immigrants who will return to their country of origin and assist in its development.  It is 
described as a “win-win-win solution” because it maximizes benefits for the stakeholders and 
minimizes conflict between them (Pastore, 2008).  For example, the Spanish civil society will 
feel less threatened because integration of immigrants is not a goal of the policy and they will be 
taking only the jobs that Spaniards themselves refuse to do.   
Given that migrants continue to arrive in Spain and that there has only been limited 
success in achieving „immigration control‟ through other policies, it seems that Spain was 
considering a different approach though circular migration prior to the global financial crisis of 
2008-2009.  When the financial crisis hit, Spanish immigration policy changed significantly and 
is described as being more similar to other European states today than it ever has been.  For the 
first time, immigrants and Spanish citizens were competing for the same jobs, such as harvesting 
strawberries (Burnett, 2009).  The Spanish government began offering to pay immigrants their 
unemployment benefits as a lump-sum if they agree to return to their countries of origin for the 
next three years, giving the Spanish economy time to rebound and citizens a chance to get back 
to work (Abend, , L., 2008; Tarvaine, 2010).  As the unemployment rate among immigrants has 
grown to about 30% (compared to 19% among Spanish citizens), a few thousand immigrants, 
mostly Latin Americans, have taken Spain up on this offer (Immigration: economic impact on 
EU rules).  
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The think tank FRIDE released a report that summarizes the change in Spanish policy very well: 
The PSOE government has adopted one of the most progressive immigration policies of 
all EU member states, and this has had a positive impact on its foreign policy. However, 
since the financial crisis, the integration of immigrants in Spain has rapidly decreased. 
Before, immigrants were seen to play a leading role in the country‟s economic growth. In 
February 2007, Spain‟s Council of Ministers approved the Strategic Plan on Citizenship 
and Integration 2007–2010, with a budget of over EUR 2000 million dedicated to 
managing migration flows and integration processes. Yet in September 2008, the same 
government proposed a Voluntary Return Plan. (Tedesco, 2010, p. 1) 
 
According to the Earth Times, “the eastern town of Vic announced that it would no 
longer allow undocumented immigrants to register as residents, barring them access to health 
care, education and other social services” (Tarvaine, 2010).  In Spain it is illegal to prevent 
anyone, even illegal immigrants, from access to basic social services, which Prime Minister Luis 
Zapatero reiterated in response to the announcement (Ibid.).   Localities are frustrated by the 
burden of trying to help their residents while also abiding by national regulations that require 
them to provide for immigrants and their families.  The People‟s Party has reopened the 
immigration debate and is considering adopting a “contract of integration” that would require 
immigrants to adopt Spanish culture (Ibid.).  Ironically, this contract seems very similar to the 
age-old French integration policies that have led to conflicts in the banlieues across France.  
Spain is also extending prison sentences for those who enter the country illegally, increasing the 
number of repatriations, and making it more difficult for those authorized to enter to bring their 
families with them, therefore making it more difficult for them to settle permanently.  For Spain, 
the economic crisis may have just given the government a free-pass to match its immigration 
policies with the European model
25.   By reducing “advantages for Latin American immigrants” 
and imposing more restrictive measures it can achieve the immigration control it now desires and 
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 Spanish policy is now more compatible with two EU measures: the Return Directive (June 2008) and the Pact on 
Immigration and Asylum (September 2008) (Tedesco, 2010, p. 4).  
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still maintain good relations with immigrant-sending countries by “blam[ing] the new limitations 
on Brussels” (Tedesco, 2010, p. 1).  
Assessment of human security 
 
As in France, immigrants in Spain do have to contend with some human security 
concerns.  Interestingly, some of the most obvious examples of insecurity found in France are 
not true of the Spanish case.  Because there is less forced integration and immigrants are able 
adjust at their own pace, there seems to be less conflict between the locals and immigrants.  Yes, 
there are still specific cases of violence or discrimination that should be addressed, but up until 
2008 at least, immigrants in Spain seemed to have fewer reasons to be fearful.  Unfortunately, 
these immigrants are less secure today than they were prior to the financial crisis because of 
higher unemployment and increased frustrations on the part of native Spaniards.  As the 
economic climate has pushed the Spanish government to change its policies to resemble those in 
other European states, the security of immigrants has also changed to become more reflective of 
the circumstances in other places like France.  In light of the current situation, there are some 
specific aspects of human security that could be addressed to undo the damage caused by the 
financial crisis.  Naturally, any action will encounter sour public opinion as a response; therefore, 
the government will have to balance protecting human security of immigrants with resolving 
issues faced by Spanish citizens.  Now that Spanish policies and immigrant struggles more 
closely parallel other states like France, there may be a greater incentive for the Spanish 
government to cooperate, potentially through the EU.   
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The role of the European Union 
Immigration did not affect the entire region when the European Community was 
established in 1958.  By the time the community became the European Union in 1993, however, 
newer member states were beginning to experience larger inflows of immigrants thanks to the 
economic success of the European Economic Community.  Member states agreed to consider 
immigration issues supranationally after the establishment of the Schengen accords in 1985 and 
1990.  These agreements represent “an effort to arrive at a common border control policy and to 
work toward a common immigration policy” (Bookman, 2002, p. 197). With the establishment 
of free movement of people, it became clear that immigration was no longer an isolated problem 
affecting individual states.   
Initially, the member states handled immigration issues mainly through 
intergovernmental cooperation.  The Maastricht Treaty, 1992, created two additional pillars that 
included areas that EU member states wished to cooperate on, but were not quite ready to put 
beneath the original community framework (Wallace, Wallace, & Pollack, 2005, p. 460).  Pillar 
Three is Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), which includes issues that until Maastricht had been 
tied to state sovereignty, such as immigration and asylum policy.  Initially, JHA‟s structure was 
loosely intergovernmental, but as progress was made, instruments and institutions were 
developed, and states found it easier to make collective decisions, they agreed to move slowly 
toward further integration with regard to certain issues (Ibid., p. 459).   
In 1999, the Amsterdam Treaty brought the Schengen acquis into the EU‟s institutional 
framework and transferring part of JHA (migration-related policies) from Pillar Three to Pillar 
One (Kostakopoulou, 2001, p. 77; Wallace et al., 2005, p. 459).  An emphasis on 
intergovernmental decision-making remained for a while, since the states clearly had a vested 
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interest in shaping how EU immigration policies would affect them individually (Geddes, 2000, 
p. 111).  Nonetheless, for the first time, immigration matters fell under EU competencies 
(Messina & Lahav, 2006, p. 349).  At the 1999 Tampere Summit, EU leaders developed a 
strategy to implement the JHA framework set out by the Amsterdam Treaty.  They adopted the 
resulting Hague program
26, “which sets the objectives for strengthening freedom, security and 
justice in the EU for the period 2005-2010” (Towards a common European Union immigration 
policy, 2007).  This program outlined objectives for making progress on issues such as asylum 
and immigration.  In 2002, the “Comprehensive Action Plan to Combat Illegal Immigration and 
Trafficking in Human Beings” was adopted, demonstrating the commitment of EU member 
states to act together (Wallace et al., 2005, p. 474).  By the time the global financial crisis hit, the 
EU had eliminated internal border controls, adopted a common visa policy, synchronized 
external border controls and asylum standards, promised to cooperate on illegal immigration, and 
developed a fund to cover immigration policy-related expenses.  
In response to the recent global financial crisis, the European Union recognizes that new 
policies are needed to deal with the new challenges faced by immigrant-receiving member states.  
In the summer of 2008, the Return Directive and the Pact on Immigration and Asylum were 
created to serve this purpose.  The Return Directive is designed to be “a step towards a European 
immigration policy” and “will encourage the voluntary return of illegal immigrants but otherwise 
lay down minimum standards for their treatment” (Parliament adopts directive on return of 
illegal immigrants, 2008).   The EU rules for returning illegal immigrants to their home countries 
were clearly outlined and states were forbidden from enacting immigration policies that are 
stricter than those at the EU level (however, they are allowed to be more lenient).  Regarding 
deportation of unauthorized entrants, member states must give immigrants a period of time in 
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 The Hague program was confirmed in 2004. 
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which they may leave the EU voluntarily before a removal order is issued (Ibid.).  Once an 
illegal immigrant is removed from the EU, he or she is banned from reentering for a minimum of 
five years, unless an individual state chooses to waive the ban.  Children and families are to be 
treated with special consideration in the deportation process.  Finally, the Return Directive also 
includes provisions for changes in policy in the event of emergencies and for preventing 
immigrants from being forced to return home if doing so would put their lives in danger.   
The Pact on Immigration and Asylum was intended to increase cooperation on 
immigration issues among European states and to allow for greater coordination of policy 
(European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, 2008, p. 4).  The eventual goal is to work toward 
fully integrated immigration policies, but given the degree of variability in immigration patterns 
across Europe, this will be a significant challenge.  Although the Pact lists a multitude of specific 
objectives, there are a few that are of particular interest to this study.  Relevant to the Spanish 
case study, regularization of immigrants must now be done on a case-by-case basis rather than 
through sweeping regularization policies such as Spain had utilized in the past (Ibid., p. 7).  The 
EU also wants to cooperate with immigrant-sending nations, which will give the EU a voice in 
discussions that were mostly bilateral in the past.  Finally, the EU will take steps to protect the 
rights of immigrants from abuses in the workplace and to prevent them from being exploited.  
This goal essentially indicates that the EU will concern itself with aspects of the human security 
of immigrants, though without using the term. 
In 2009, high unemployment continued to linger in most European states and the EU 
agreed to authorize charter flights to take illegal immigrants back to their home countries (EU 
leaders say illegal entrants can be sent home on charter flights, 2009).  Although human rights 
organizations balked at this decision, the governments of Italy and France insisted it was 
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necessary to prevent conditions from deteriorating in their own countries.  Other EU members 
such as the UK have also made use of the flights (Ibid.).  In February 2010, the EU called for 
increased funding to modernize border security, which is coordinated and maintained through the 
Frontex
27
 agency (EU bids to revamp immigration controls, 2010).  
All of these recent changes in EU policy have considerably altered the way immigration 
is handled in the European Union.  For the first time, a concerted effort is being made to 
coordinate policies at the supranational level, rather than the empty dialogue that has taken place 
in the past.  Although member states are given some degree of flexibility in enacting policies and 
tailoring them to their individual circumstances, the EU has determined that it alone can decide 
how strict enforcement of deportation regulations will be.  This bodes well for a discussion of the 
protection of human security of immigrants in the European Union.   
According to the European Commission, “the main objective [of the EU] is to better 
manage migration flows by a coordinated approach which takes into account the economic and 
demographic situation of the EU” (Towards a common European Union immigration policy, 
2007).  Despite the recent progress and steps taken to further integrate migration issues at the 
supranational level, the EU remains somewhat constrained by state sovereignty.  Certain states 
are concerned about the difficulties of implementing a unified immigration policy within the 
Union.  Issues such as funding, extent of borders of some states, definitions of state citizenship, 
and the relative newness of the problem in particular states make the topic even more 
complicated.  In addition, member states continue to engage in cooperation outside the EU 
framework, such as the so-called G6 which deals with illegal immigration among other things
28
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 Frontex was established in October 2005 to patrol over 30,000 miles of the EU border, both land and water (EU 
bids to revamp immigration controls, 2010). 
28
 Established in 2003 as the G5, it became the G6 in 2006 when Poland joined the original members: Germany, 
France, United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain (EU G6 nations agree to fight terrorism and illegal immigration, 2006). 
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(Wallace et al., 2005, p. 466).  Spain and France also coordinate policies through the EU‟s Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighborhood Policy organized by the 
Commission.   
Policy Analysis: effectiveness of French, Spanish, and EU policies 
 
 In order to determine at which level policymaking is most effective, many individual 
policies enacted by France, Spain, and the EU were all considered.  Each of these policies had to 
be related to immigration and could not exclude the North African group.  Policies only intended 
for North African immigrants were included.    The process for evaluating policies was 
conducted by following a series of steps.  First, the intended outcome of each policy was 
determined by looking through immigration literature, newspaper articles, and government 
descriptions online (especially in the case of the EU).  The next step was to determine the 
outcome of the policy: what effect(s) did it actually have?  Finally, by comparing the intended 
outcome with the actual result, the effectiveness of each policy was graded on a 5 point scale.  
Those policies that achieved their intended outcome received a score of 5 while those that were 
completely ineffective received a 2.  Policies that achieved the opposite of what they intended to 
received a score of 1.  It must be noted that a considerable amount of the research into French 
and Spanish policies was conducted as part of an undergraduate thesis.  For this reason, when 
adding additional policies for those countries and conducting research on the EU, the same 
methodology used previously was maintained in the interest of consistency and to avoid having 
to repeat the entire process.  Although the methods are relatively basic and no statistical analysis 
was completed, it is still possible to draw useful comparisons.   Even though recent policies 
created in 2008 and 2009 may not have reached their full effects yet, they were still assigned 
60 
 
tentative scores because of the important changes they reflect.  In a couple cases a “?” was 
assigned to a recent policy because there was no data from which to determine a score.  The full 
results of the policy analysis process are included in Appendix B, though Table 1 below 
summarizes the results. 
 
Table 1 
Source of Policy Policy Type Mean Effectiveness Affect on Human 
Security 
France Economic 2.9 Positive & Negative 
France Immigration Control 3.3 One, Negative 
France Integration 4 Positive 
France Religion 2.9 Positive 
Spain Economic 2.6 Positive & Negative 
Spain Immigration Control 3.4 Mostly Negative 
Spain Integration 3 Positive 
EU Policy Coordination 3.3 One, Positive 
EU Immigration Control 4 (only one policy) Positive & Negative 
 
 By looking at the effectiveness of various types of immigration policies, there are a few 
patterns that are worth pointing out in the cases of France, Spain, and the EU, as well as some 
overall trends.  Beginning with France, it appears that policymaking improved with time.   For 
example, the French government did not have much success controlling immigration with early 
policies like naturalization and amnesty, so they issued laws to focus specifically on curtailing 
unauthorized flows, such as with the Barre-Bonnet Laws or the Pasqua Laws.  These policies 
were much more effective as they de-incentivized entering without permission, whereas granting 
amnesty had the opposite effect.  Another example of successfully adapting policies to achieve a 
desired outcome is in the realm of protecting laïcité, or religious policy.  The French government 
has found that promoting secularism required action rather than just making suggestions.  Early 
policies to reaffirm laïcité or to revise guidelines explaining secularism did not prevent the 
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increasing visibility of Islam.  Therefore, the French government went one step further and 
banned headscarves in schools.  For some this went too far, while others clamored that it was not 
enough.  It seems that the government is listening to the opinions of the latter group, as it now 
may ban full coverings in public.  Overall, economic policies have not done much to achieve 
immigration-related objectives.  It seems that the most effective types of policies in France are 
immigration control and integration. 
 It is also evident that certain policies are intrinsically linked to human security, though 
they can affect positively or negatively.  Economic policies have mixed effects on human 
security depending on the intention of the policy.  A policy that seeks to slow or reduce growth 
of a heavily populated urban center, such as Paris, improves human security by increasing the 
effectiveness of resources devoted to public services.  On the other hand, economic policies like 
the Fontanet Circular, which made it more difficult for illegal immigrants to obtain employment, 
causes immigrants to become less secure.  If they are unable to find employment, they may not 
be able to provide for themselves and any dependents they may have.  These immigrants could 
also seek illicit employment, resorting to prostitution or dealing drugs out of desperation.  
Integration policies appear to have the greatest positive impact on human security.  Because 
these policies are designed to improve the situation of immigrants in various respects, they 
naturally do more to improve their security.  Unfortunately for immigrants, there have been far 
fewer integration policies than immigration control policies, most likely because of low public 
opinion and political will in France.   
 Immigration policymaking in Spain has had less time to evolve than in France, but 
nonetheless there are some identifiable trends.  As in France, economic policies have had little to 
moderate success.  Interestingly, the recent policy of contracting workers for seasonal harvest 
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was proving to be quite successful before the economic crisis forced the program to be cut 
significantly.  This provides some credibility to ideas about circular migration being a solution 
for controlling flows into Spain.  The key difference between French and Spanish immigration 
control policies is that Spain has often resorted to regularization of illegal immigrants.  By 
“fixing” the status of immigrants deemed to be a problem by other EU members, Spain was able 
to maintain economic growth and avoid being accused of doing nothing.  These policies were 
effective in this regard, but because they encouraged unauthorized immigration to continue, their 
scores were reduced.  Unlike in France, Spain has not enacted any policies of a religious nature, 
simply because Spain does not have a secular tradition.  There have only been two policies 
enacted to improve integration of immigrants: the 1994 Plan for the Social Integration of 
Immigrants and the recent Strategic Plan on Citizenship and Integration (2007-present).  
Although they were both moderately effective, the primary reason for the scarcity of this type of 
policy is the natural ability of the Spanish society to absorb immigrants with relatively mild side 
effects.  It is probable that public opinion and political will also prevented any additional action 
from taking place. 
 Human security of immigrants was affected by many policies in the case of Spain.  The 
initial economic policies the government enacted negatively impacted security of immigrants 
because they were more concerned with addressing high unemployment of citizens.  As the 
Spanish economy strengthened post-EU accession, new policies did not have this negative effect 
until the recent Voluntary Return Plan.  This policy is sending immigrants back to countries that 
are less secure than Spain to begin with because of development problems.  It may further 
contribute to insecurity for immigrants in the long-term if they are unable to find employment in 
their home countries or are unable to return to Spain at the end of the three year return period.  
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Immigration control policies in Spain that regularized unauthorized residents improved the 
security of those immigrants substantially.  Once they were granted amnesty from the 
government, they no longer had to fear extradition and would be able to secure employment with 
greater ease.  Integration policies have also helped to improve the immigrant human security for 
reasons similar to those in France.  As a whole, fewer policies in Spain had negative effects on 
human security in Spain than in France.  Cultural, historical, and societal differences between the 
two countries most likely account for this difference. 
 Returning to the theories introduced in the beginning of this paper adds value to a 
comparison of policies enacted in France and Spain by outlining additional similarities and 
differences between them.  Of the four categories of theory, power resources or power 
constellation, state-centric and institutional, cost-benefit or economic, and cultural and racial, 
three are important to the cases.  Power resources, cost-benefit theories, and cultural/racial 
theories all offer some explanatory value.  The balance between political parties, Muslim 
immigrant groups, the general public, and business that hire these workers is a constant struggle 
in France.  In line with theories about power, it is difficult for the French government to enact 
immigration policies because of these stakeholders, each with a certain amount of power and 
influence.  Even though this conflict constrains policymaking, the government has still enacted 
policies that one group finds unappealing, such as the ban on religious symbols.   
In Spain the struggle for power does not seem to have played as important a role in 
immigration policy formation in the past like in France.  Power does in part explain why Spain 
has been able to adopt lenient immigration policies, however.  Because of the need for immigrant 
labor and the ability of the country to absorb foreign workers, groups in Spain have not been 
adamantly against immigration except in times of economic crisis.  In these periods, Spain‟s 
64 
 
lenient policies become stricter out of necessity.  As Spain‟s policy becomes more similar to the 
rest of Europe, it remains to be seen if the same conflict we see in France will become a problem.  
With more restrictive immigration policies there may be a backlash from immigrant groups.     
Cost-benefit theories are also relevant because the Spanish economy in particular relies on 
foreign labor to maintain its agricultural sector.  Therefore, actions to restrict immigration must 
involve balancing the need for labor.  The same is seen in France, though the French economy 
will be less dependent on foreign labor than some of its European neighbors because of its higher 
birth rate.  Europe is predominantly composed of a single ethnic group, which makes racial 
theories relevant as they explain some of the reaction of the public against North African 
immigrants, among others.  Some immigrants from other racial groups enter Europe to work in 
professions requiring high skills levels, but many others work predominantly in low-paying 
sectors that citizens generally avoid.  The tensions in Europe are most definitely less severe and 
less violent that many other examples of racial strife.   
Cultural theories explain why European citizens and immigrants have a hard time 
associating within a single society.  Although religion is the biggest factor separating North 
African immigrants from the French and Spanish, there are also cultural differences.  Geographic 
proximity and history have brought particularly Moroccan culture closer to that of Spain.  
France‟s colonial legacy in Algeria has also left its mark.  Overall, all three of these types of 
theories characterize immigration in Europe, though to different degrees depending on the 
individual case study.   
 EU immigration policymaking is different from that of Spain or France by virtue of the 
intergovernmental cooperation that must occur for it to take place.  Immigration policies enacted 
at the EU level have had limited to moderate success.  They have been able to increase dialogue 
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between member states and to encourage them to cooperate.  Although integration of 
immigration policies has faced resistance, it appears that the economic crisis may have 
encouraged member states to reconsider it as a viable solution.  The ultimate objective for many 
is to control or stop immigration, which they may be able to do in aftermath of the economic 
crisis.  It is unlikely that this will be sustainable, however.  In time, some European states like 
Spain will need immigrant labor to once again fill gaps in their labor markets. 
 Human security of immigrants has not been affected by EU policies until recently.  With 
efforts to reduce trafficking of immigrants in 2002, human security of migrants improved 
because they were less likely to be forcibly taken into Europe.  This, unfortunately, does not 
mean that they did not willfully agree to be smuggled in or attempt to enter unlawfully by some 
other means.  The two EU policies enacted in the summer of 2008 also impacted the security of 
immigrants.  The Return Directive negatively affected human security in that it allowed for 
imprisonment of unauthorized immigrants unwilling to voluntarily return to their countries of 
origin.  The Pact on Immigration and Asylum, on the other hand, improves the security of 
immigrants by protecting their rights and preventing any EU member state from implementing 
unnecessarily harsh punishments.  With the Pact balancing out the potential negative effects of 
the Directive, human security of immigrants has finally been addressed at the EU level. 
 Overall, it appears that the most effective types of immigration policies tend to be 
immigration control and integration.  Immigration control receives the most popular support and 
has the greatest breadth of any one type of policy.  It also appears that states tend to improve 
upon their policies over time.  Without further integration and more policies to analyze, it 
remains unclear if policymaking at the EU level can be as or more effective than national 
policies.  Human security has not been addressed as well at the EU-level as it had locally, but 
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again this is an issue that needs to be readdressed if and when the EU enacts further immigration 
policy.  It seems that both France and Spain have been able to address human security concerns, 
but there is room for improvement.  Spain has not had a need for prolific integration 
policymaking as in France, but in the future it may well need to follow the French example.  The 
main criticism of French policy is its steadfast protection of secularism which is causing conflicts 
with Muslim women.  Despite low public opinion, France does need to continue to work on 
integration, particularly in the banlieues.  Violent rioting has already happened over tensions 
with second-generation immigrants and there is potential for a recurrence of such outbursts if 
more is not done to address their needs. 
Conclusions 
 
French vs. Spanish immigration policy 
 
 For many reasons, French and Spanish immigration policies have been traditionally quite 
different.  France has been coping with immigration for much longer and as a result has had time 
to try different strategies.  Ultimately, the prevailing determinants of policymaking are public 
opinion, the protection of secularism, and political will to take action.  Spain has less history to 
rely on and a very different policymaking environment.  As in France, public opinion and 
political will continue to play a major role in shaping immigration policymaking in the future.  
Because Spain is divided into autonomous communities with some very strong regional 
personalities, the Spanish government has learned to cope with diversity by decentralizing 
power.  This practice and strong growth since the late 1980s have allowed Spain to absorb 
immigrants the way France was able to in the 1970s or 1980s. 
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 The financial crisis has had the effect of forcing Spanish policy to become more similar 
to the strict European standards held in many other EU member states.  Although the political 
and historical background of Spain allowed the state to maintain lenient policies from the 1980s 
until 2008, the government can no longer justify them in the face of high unemployment amongst 
both the general population and immigrants.  The key difference between France and Spain at 
this point is this: in France rioting and protests continue to be the primary outlet for concerns 
over immigration, whereas in Spain this occurs to a much lesser degree even in the face of an 
economic crisis.  The easiest explanation is that Spanish culture allows for a laissez-faire 
approach to immigration, yet low public opinion during recessions does indicate that they care 
about the issue enough to consider it a problem.  It seems that in Spain North African immigrants 
become a scapegoat for the woes of society whereas in France they are viewed to be a persistent 
risk to the protection of laïcité.   
Prospects for cooperation at the EU level 
 
 Spain and France have already taken steps to cooperate on immigration issues through 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and by agreeing to recent EU initiatives, like the Pact on 
Immigration and Asylum, to further address the issue at the EU level.  If the past is any 
indication, however; efforts at the EU level will be slow to make progress as member state 
sovereignty and interests take precedence.  The EU has intended to make immigration a priority 
for quite some time, since it began addressing asylum issues in the late 1990s, but it has been 
unsuccessful in achieving full integration at the supranational level.  If the EU is going to be able 
to do so, right now seems to be the ideal time.  Because of economic conditions, there is 
increased support for immigration control across the continent.  Comparatively, immigration 
policies across the board are more similar now than they have ever been, with states like Spain 
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introducing more restrictive policies.  The approval of the Pact on Immigration and Asylum and 
the Return Directive provide us with concrete evidence of the renewed momentum with which 
member states want to address the issue.   
 Despite indications that the EU will be able to finally achieve integrated immigration 
policy, there are some potential problems and drawbacks that may cause problems down the line.  
Even though member states interests are in line right now, once European states achieve 
economic recovery, this may well change.  Right now, the Pact on Immigration and Asylum does 
allow for more lenient immigration polices than those outlined by the EU.  This will 
accommodate some states that are more dependent on immigration to change their policies later.  
A potential problem would be the reaction of states that choose to maintain rigid policies.  As 
long as the Schengen zone affords for free movement of people, immigrants will be free to move 
amongst European states.  The preferred destinations of France, Germany, and the UK may 
eventually be unable to sustain further growth in their immigrant populations, despite having 
relatively lower birthrates.  Many people are fearful of Europe becoming “Eurabia” and they will 
continue to support measures that limit the odds of this occurring (Tales from Eurabia, 2006).  
The best way for the influx to be controlled is to maintain some sort of uniformly restrictive 
policy for the EU as a whole.       
Future of immigration policy and human security in Europe 
 
 The issue of human security at the EU level raises some interesting questions.  In 
their report issued for European Union High Representative Javier Solana in 2004, the Study 
Group on Europe‟s Security Capabilities addressed the need for a human security paradigm to be 
the basis for European security.  This report, entitled A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: the 
Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe‟s Security Capabilities, became the foundation 
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for the compilation the group produced which elaborated on the ideas promoted in the report.  A 
Human Security Doctrine for Europe: Project, principles, practicalities contains fifteen studies on 
a variety of security-related issues deemed to be essential in the formation and practical 
application of such a doctrine within the European Union. 
The authors emphasize the primacy of human rights, clear political authority, 
multilateralism, a bottom-up approach, a regional focus, use of legal instruments, and appropriate 
use of force.  In order to establish the doctrine in the EU through institutional embedding and 
resourcing they will need democratic control, bottom-up accountability, and financing.  The 
motivations for pursuing a human security doctrine lie primarily in principles of morality and 
legality, as well as in the enlightened self-interest of the EU.  The authors believe that the EU 
should move from focusing on defense to focusing on security, ideally human security.  Glasius 
and Kaldor establish that the „holistic‟ security concept already advocated in Europe, which 
focuses on protection of human rights, could be more narrowly defined through human security 
to make it clearer when action needs to be taken toward protecting security.  Although they 
admit that the achievement of a human security doctrine will be an ongoing process, they 
demonstrate that through integration the EU has already begun to take steps that will allow for its 
encouragement. 
There are several issues that make adoption of a human security doctrine in Europe 
difficult.  First, the definition of human security must be agreed upon.  Different actors in Europe 
have used the term in different ways, from the narrow freedom from fear definition to a very 
broad one encompassing, and practically equaling, human rights.  Second, the practical 
implementation of such a doctrine could be either as simple as renaming existing initiatives to 
include the human security label, or it could involve reinventing them entirely to give them a 
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new focus.  Depending how human security is defined, many EU initiatives, such as the 
European Security Strategy (2003), may already be working toward the promotion of human 
security.  Finally, specific goals mentioned in the report, like the creation of a human security 
response force, will require substantial resources from member states that may not be willing to 
give them.   
Despite the problems with the doctrine, the report and subsequent text that promote it do 
offer legitimate reasons why adopting a human security doctrine makes sense for Europe.  With 
further integration and a more clear identity in the world, thanks to changes made by the Lisbon 
Treaty, the EU could potentially become the champion of the protection of security of 
individuals.  Its very existence demonstrates that the nation-state need not be main actor on all 
issues, and perhaps those related to human security, like immigration, should have a different 
focus as well.  Although some scholars still promote the concept of a human security doctrine in 
Europe, progress has stalled since the Study Group on Europe‟s Security Capabilities put forth 
its recommendation.  Other more pressing matters, such as ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
economic crisis, and EU expansion, have taken precedence.  It may perpetually remain on the 
back burner until an EU leader with substantial political clout decides to resurrect it. 
There are a relatively limited number ways in which the role of human security and 
immigration policy might play out in the EU.  The first would be essentially maintenance of the 
pre-economic crisis stalemate.  Unable to reconcile differences in immigration policymaking, EU 
member states will not allow for complete integration at the EU level, leaving the Union to only 
occasionally reiterate the importance of cooperation.  Likewise, without a renewed interest in the 
human security doctrine, most likely due to its overly broad definition and perceived lack of 
utility to policymakers, the concept will not be employed by the EU.  The second prospective 
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outcome would include substantial gains on integration of immigration policymaking.  With 
recent successes on this front in 2009, there seems to be hope for continued progress.  As 
integration progresses, the EU will have more control over the types of policies used to control 
immigration flows or to improve integration.  The EU could impose general policies and require 
EU member states to implement them, which would allow states to make adjustments to fit their 
specific needs.   
In a much less likely scenario, immigration policymaking would continue to be 
implemented only at the national level and the EU would find justification for adopting a human 
security doctrine to be used to address concerns in other areas besides immigration.  These other 
applications might include environmental policy (a favorite among many Europeans) or support 
of external actions of the EU, including interventions by the Rapid Reaction Force.  Finally, the 
last outcome would be increased integration of immigration policies at the EU level and adoption 
of a human security doctrine.  Achieving both of these goals would allow for better protection of 
immigrants across the EU through mutually agreed-upon policies.  Nonetheless, there still 
remain difficult questions about how to implement a human security doctrine and how it could 
be used to reconcile protection of EU citizens and foreigners living amongst them.  The reality is 
that for the time development of such as doctrine is constrained by numerous intervening 
variables, particularly state sovereignty.  It also remains unclear if immigration policymaking 
would be more effective or better able to handle human security concerns that individual states 
can.  The EU‟s strong record of protecting human rights and creating common asylum policies 
are helpful indicators, but it still remains to be seen the EU has the strength to replicate those 
successes.   
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In the meantime, additional research needs to be conducted to determine if any other EU 
member states have found more effective immigration policies or are better able to promote 
human security.  States such as the UK and Germany are known to receive very large numbers of 
immigrants each year.  Italy may also present an interesting case as discrimination against 
immigrants is quite prevalent.  As this study focused on North African immigrants, it may be 
worth repeating to investigate the human security issues faced by other immigrant groups, such 
as Sub-Saharan Africans.  Future studies should include field research that would be better able 
to describe and evaluate the security of immigrants across the EU.  As patterns of immigration 
evolve and political environments change, there will be a need for continual updating of the 
research as well.  Though there is a lot to be learned from comparative case studies such as this 
one, they are clearly only one small piece of the puzzle.  As researchers continue to study this 
subject, it will be the drive to better understand immigrants and the challenges they face that will 
fuel the studies that may one day affect the policymakers‟ decisions. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Appendix A: 
 
 France Spain 
Population (2010) 62.6 million 45.3 million 
Remittances (2008) 15,908 million USD 11,776 million USD 
Net migration rate (2005-2010) 1.6 migrants/1000 pop 7.9 migrants/1000 pop 
Immigrants as % pop. (2010) 10.7% 14.1% 
Women as % immigrants (2010) 51.3% 47.9% 
 
(France, 2010; Spain, 2010) 
 
Appendix B: 
 
*Explanation of rankings: 
5: policy fully achieves intended outcome 
4: outcome mostly achieved 
3: outcome partially achieved  
2: outcome not achieved, neutral result 
1: policy had opposite result of intended outcome 
 
** Human security considerations begin the moment an immigrant leaves his or her home country with the intention 
to immigrate into another.  The determination of whether or not a policy has an effect on human security is made 
under the assumption that a policy is entirely effective (ranked with a 5).  It is important to note that the effect on 
human security is less pronounced in policies ranked with lower scores.   
Where Policy Year Policy Type 
Intended 
Outcome 
Effectiveness 
Rating* 
Impact on 
human 
security?** 
France 
Expulsion of 
workers 1968 Economic End worker's strike 2 yes, negative 
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France 
Decentralization of 
Paris 
1960s-
1970s Economic 
Alleviate strain on 
public services and 
slow growth of 
banlieues 3 
yes, positive 
for immigrants 
in Paris 
France 
Laws controlling 
immigration flows 1970s Economic 
Reduce hiring of 
immigrants 3 yes, negative 
France Marcellin Circular 1972 Economic 
Link work and 
residency permits 3 yes, positive 
France Fontanet Circular 1972 Economic 
Reduce hiring of 
illegal immigrants 2 
yes, negative 
for illegal 
immigrants 
France 
Ban on 
immigration of 
workers 
1974-
1975 Economic 
Gain control over 
immigration of 
labor 3 no 
France Auroux Laws 1992 Economic Reduce strikes 4 
yes, positive 
for less time 
off work, 
negative for 
less voice over 
issues 
France 
Bilateral 
agreements with 
Morocco & 
Tunisia 1960s 
Immigration 
control 
Increase 
immigration by 
granting work 
permits 5 no 
France 
Naturalization and 
amnesty 1960s 
Immigration 
control 
Reduce illegal 
immigration 1 no 
France Giscard circular 1974 
Immigration 
control 
Reduce # 
immigrants 2 no 
France "Aide de retour" 1977 
Immigration 
control 
Encourage return 
to country of 
origin 3 yes, negative 
France 
Barre-Bonnet 
Laws 1980 
Immigration 
control 
Reduce illegal 
immigration 4 no 
France Pasqua Law 1993 
Immigration 
control 
Reduce legal 
immigration 4   
France 
French nationality 
code revisions 1993 
Immigration 
control 
Make citizenship 
harder to obtain to 
reduce 
immigration 3 or 4 no 
France 
Sarkozy's quotas 
and prioritization 
of integrable 
immigrants 
2006-
present 
Immigration 
control 
Limit entry of 
immigrants that do 
not easily integrate 3 or 4 no 
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France 
Favoring 
professional 
immigration 
2007-
present 
Immigration 
control 
Control legal 
immigration with 
preferences 4 no 
France Grenelle Accords 1968 Integration 
Eliminate 
bidonvilles 
(ghettos) in favor 
of public housing 5 yes, positive 
France "Seventh Plan" 
1975-
1981 Integration 
Allow family 
reunification, 
reduce illegal 
immigration 3 or 4 
yes, positive 
for family 
reunification 
France 
Mitterand's 
integration policies 1980s Integration 
Increase 
integration of 
immigrants into 
society 4 yes, positive 
France 
French nationality 
code revisions 1987 Integration 
Promotion of 
nationalism 3 yes, negative 
France 
High Council for 
the Integration of 
Immigrants 1990 Integration 
Reduce social 
unrest within 
immigrant 
communities 3 or 4 yes, positive 
France Guigou bill 1998 Integration 
Dictate citizenship 
requirements for 
children of 
immigrants 5 yes, positive 
France 
Creation of 
HALDE  2004 Integration 
Provide legal 
counsel for 
immigrants 4 yes, positive 
France 
Priority education 
zones 2000s Integration 
Increase funding 
for schools with 
many immigrants 4 yes, positive 
France 
Creation of 
Ministry of 
Immigration, 
Integration, 
National Identity 
and Co-
Development 2007 
Integration and 
immigration 
control 
Improve 
integration, reduce 
entry, promote 
national identity 3 
yes, positive, 
integrated 
immigrants 
more accepted 
in society 
France 
Regulation of 
mosque 
construction 1920s Religion 
Reduce visibility 
of Islam 3 no 
France 
Reaffirmation of 
laïcité 1989 Religion 
Resolve affaire du 
foulard  2 no 
France Bayrou guidelines 1994 Religion 
Resolve affaire du 
foulard  3 no 
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France 
Creation of French 
Council of the 
Muslim Religion 2002 Religion 
Reduce inequality, 
ensure 
representation of 
Muslims 4 yes, positive 
France 
"Affirmative 
action" for 
immigrant youth 2002 Religion 
Ensure Muslim 
youth receive 
education 4 yes, positive 
France 
Law 2004-228 
(ban on religious 
symbols in 
schools) 2004 Religion 
Resolve affaire du 
foulard by banning 
headscarves in 
schools 4 
yes, negative 
(fear for some) 
France 
Ban on the voile 
integrale 2010 Religion 
Resolve affaire du 
foulard by banning 
full veils in public 
places ? 
yes, negative 
(fear for some) 
Where Policy Year Policy Type 
Intended 
Outcome 
Effectiveness 
Rating* 
Impact on 
human 
security?** 
Spain 
Restricting 
immigrant labor to 
pre-determined 
sectors 
1980-
present Economic 
Reduce 
unemployment for 
citizens 2 yes, negative 
Spain 
Ley Orgánica 
7/1985 1985 Economic 
Reduce 
unemployment for 
citizens 2 yes, negative 
Spain 
Resolution of 4 
May 1993 
(Contingente quota 
system) 1993 Economic 
Reduce non-
integrable 
immigration with 
quotas 2 no 
Spain 
Work contracts: 
strawberry harvest 
2005-
present Economic 
Promote circular 
migration of labor, 
reduce permanent 
immigration 4 
yes, positive,  
multiple 
contracts 
Spain 
Voluntary Return 
Plan 
2008-
2009 Economic 
Reduce immigrant 
population for the 
next three years  3 yes, negative 
Spain 
Ley Orgánica 
7/1985 1985 
Immigration 
control 
Outline rules for 
entry and residence 5 no 
Spain Regularization 
1985-
1986 
Immigration 
control 
Reduce # illegal 
immigrants in 
Spain 3 yes, positive 
Spain 
Visa requirement 
for Moroccans 1991 
Immigration 
control 
Reduce 
immigration 3 no 
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Spain Regularization 
1991-
1992 
Immigration 
control 
Reduce # illegal 
immigrants in 
Spain 3 yes, positive 
Spain 
Bilateral 
agreement with 
Morocco 1993 
Immigration 
control 
Reduce smuggling 
of immigrants  3 yes, positive 
Spain Regularization 1996 
Immigration 
control 
Reduce # illegal 
immigrants in 
Spain by reg. of 
families 3 yes, positive 
Spain 
Integrated System 
of External 
Vigilance 1999 
Immigration 
control 
Reduce entry by 
patera 4 yes, positive 
Spain 
Ley Orgánica 
4/2000 2000 
Immigration 
control and 
integration 
Automatic 
regularization of 
illegal entrants and 
increased social 
rights 
3 (social 
portion 
revoked) yes, positive 
Spain Amnesty programs 
2000-
2007 
Immigration 
control 
Reduce # of illegal 
immigrants in 
Spain 4 yes, positive 
Spain Article 31.1 2001 
Immigration 
control 
Reduce 
immigration with 
residency 
conditions, combat 
illegal immigration 3 no 
Spain Plan Africa 
2006-
2008 
Immigration 
control 
Development 
assistance and 
cooperation with 
Africa to reduce 
immigration to 
Spain 3 no 
Spain Plan Africa 
2009-
2012 
Immigration 
control 
Development 
assistance and 
cooperation with 
Africa to reduce 
immigration to 
Spain ? no 
Spain 
Plan for the Social 
Integration of 
Immigrants 1994 Integration 
Reduce barriers to 
integration, reduce 
xenophobia, 
racism, 
discrimination 3 yes, positive 
Spain 
Strategic Plan on 
Citizenship and 
Integration 
2007-
2010 
Integration and 
immigration 
control 
Improve 
integration and 
better manage 
flows 3 yes, positive 
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Where Policy Year Policy Type 
Intended 
Outcome 
Effectiveness 
Rating* 
Impact on 
human 
security?** 
EU 
Maastricht Treaty: 
Creation of JHA 1992 
Policy 
coordination 
Begin cooperation 
on immigration 
policy among 
others 3 no 
EU Amsterdam Treaty 1999 
Policy 
coordination 
In part, to bring 
immigration 
matters under EU 
jurisdiction 3 no 
EU 
Tampere Summit: 
Hague program 
1999/ 
2004 
Policy 
coordination 
To increase 
cooperation on 
asylum and 
immigration 3 no 
EU 
Comprehensive 
Action Plan to 
Combat Illegal 
Immigration and 
Trafficking in 
Human Beings 2002 
Policy 
coordination 
Cooperation on 
controlling illegal 
immigration and 
trafficking 4 yes, positive 
EU Return Directive 2008 
Immigration 
control, policy 
coordination 
Harmonize rules 
for expelling 
illegal immigrants 
and allow for 
imprisonment of 
those who refuse 4 yes, negative 
EU 
Pact on 
Immigration and 
Asylum  2008 
Policy 
coordination 
Protect human 
rights of 
immigrants, 
cooperate with 
imm. sending 
states at EU level, 
some EU control 
over national 
policies, eventually 
integrate policies 3 yes, positive 
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